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In the first paper, two politicians decide whether to follow what they believe the public
wants or choose the option that secures their private gain. The public only rewards a
politician when a policy is implemented, or an action that coincides with the public decision
is chosen. Politicians with good decision-making abilities, under sufficiently high policy
rewards and moderate private benefit, take the action that generates a public benefit,
implementing the popular policy. Politicians with very poor decision-making abilities,
give sufficiently high policy rewards, choose to implement a policy regardless of what the
public want. Only popular policies are passed for salient issues.
In the second paper, two incumbents each decide on an action to maximize their popularity.
The choices are made in consideration of their beliefs on the popular and socially optimal
choices. The paper looks at the types of policies passed for both salient and non-salient
issues given different levels of clarity on public opinion. For salient issues, a divided public
is better than a united but ill-informed one. For non-salient issues, policies are always
passed when public opinion is clear, while politicians diverge strategically under low policy
payoffs when public opinion is unclear.
The third paper considers a model of lobbying where two opposing lobbyists vye for
the support of a legislator with uncertain preferences. When uncertainty on legislator
preference is low, lobbyists bid aggressively. When uncertainty is high, lobbyists bid
conservatively. When the degree of uncertainty is moderate, we find asymmetric equilibria
where one lobbyist chooses to either bid conservatively or aggressively, and the other just
enough to ensure that the average bid is equal to the legislator’s integrity threshold.
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III Introductory Remarks
Democracy has thrived as one of the most widespread institutions in governance. In repre-
sentative democracies in particular, the public exercises its will through elected politicians.
Politicians represent public interest directly or as trustees. Politicians, as direct represen-
tatives, are expected to follow the will of the people. Politicians perceived positively benefit
through popularity and increased election prospects. As trustees, politicians are expected
to make decisions that are in the public’s best interest. Although these two responsibilities
may intersect, divergence in outcomes provides politicians with opportunities to increase
their utility outside the permitted bounds of their office.
Issues arise when politicians have incentives to deviate from their mandate to serve the
public. The political agency model allows us to explore how politicians, as rational agents,
maximize their gains. Contracts within political institutions does not delineate the respon-
sibilities of its agents as clearly as private agenciers. The lack of defined guidelines com-
plicates the establishment of an effective political agency model. While the clear setting
of expectations and payoffs allows for effective monitoring in the traditional principal-
agent model, the lack of delineation in rewards and punishments provides opportunities
for politicians to misbehave.
Understanding how politicians behave is critical in ensuring that the policies passed are
beneficial to the public. Policies are enacted by the decisions of the incumbents. Politi-
cians, however, have avenues outside their official designations as representatives to benefit
from their position in office. Corruption and rent-seeking has been established empirically
and explored substantially in theory. Rent-seeking can come in the form of side payments
from government projects or lobbyist contributions for policy support. Politicians can also
improve approval and perception through pandering. Pandering politicians follow popular
decisions that may not benefit the public. When politicians pander, the decisions they
make aim to maximize public approval without regard to welfare. Given the frictions
between the roles politicians are expected to perform in office, pandering can prove to be
beneficial if the costs are sufficiently low. I explore the process of policy making abstract-
ing away from voter preferences, and focusing on interactions of competing politicians and
lobbyists.
The first paper touches on the issue of corruption and rent-seeking in political agency. The
paper looks at incumbent politicians who compete under a model of relative popularity
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with an option to pursue a private benefit. In this competitive scenario, the decision of
the opposing party and the characteristics that influence this decision will have an effect
on the payoffs, and subsequently, the decisions made by the politicians. Policies are only
enforced under unanimity. Politicians seek to maximize their gains in office by increasing
popularity perceptions. The model of relative popularity is formally introduced in this
paper. In this environment, the public knows what is best for them. There is however
an incentive to be corrupt and deviate towards a private benefit. The policies enforced
depend not only the size of the private benefit but also the type of issue in consideration.
The model allows us to look at how policies are implemented during a term and how the
game unfolds on the level of competing politicians, given their own private interests, the
public’s response, and their decision-making abilities.
The second paper focuses on the issue of pandering. Using the same model of relative
popularity, I explore an environment where popular and socially optimal choices may
differ. The public do not know what is best for them. Politicians have access to expert
opinion and have a better idea of what thesocially optimal choice is. Politicians may not
always pander when they can. The paper explores when and why pandering occurs in
a binary setting. As issues discussed in media platforms are often broken down in two
polarized opinions, there is an additional benefit in understanding how politicians position
themselves to maximize public opinion.
The third paper shifts focus from competing politicians to lobbyists. In this paper, we
approach the lobbying process as one where cash-for-favour exchanges occur as a means
to obtain access to legislators. The model uses a simultaneous lobbying structure and
takes into account the degree of uncertainty on a non-strategic legislator’s preference, the
legislator’s level of integrity, and the perceived advantages each lobbyist may have on their
respective policies The paper contributes to the understanding of shadow lobbying. By
analysing how lobbying proceeds, the results provides insights for the development more
effective lobbying regulations and provide constituents with an avenue to influence policy
outcomes before issues hit legislature floors.
The results overall enrich our understanding of how policies are made and politician sup-
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Incumbent Competition and Private Agenda
Anne Marie Go *
Abstract
Consider two politicians who decide whether to follow what they believe the elec-
torate wants or choose the option that secures their private gain. Policies are imple-
mented when the politicians reach a unanimous decision. The electorate only rewards
a politician when a policy is implemented, or when the politician is the only one
whose action coincides with the popular decision. I find that if the politicians have
good decision-making abilities, sufficiently high payoffs in policy implementation given
moderate private agenda payoffs pushes the politicians to implement the popular pol-
icy. For very poor decision-making abilities, at sufficiently high policy rewards, I
find that they vote for the same action to implement a policy regardless of what the
electorate want - converging to a decision that neither provides them with a private
benefit nor follows exactly the popular decision. For issues of very high relevance to
the electorate, only popular policies are passed.
JEL Classication: D72, D80
*Department of Economics, University of Bath; Email: a.go@bath.ac.uk
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1 Introduction
Incumbent politicians decide on policies and laws in representative democracies. Despite
being a ubiquitous feature of politics, the consequences of the decisions of the politicians
are still unclear. The literature on politician responsiveness and public opinion is divided.
While some conclude that public opinion is significant in policy (Page and Shapiro, 1983;
Erikson et al., 1989; Burstein, 2003; Hagemann et al., 2017), others find that the influence
is not as clear cut (Manza and Cook, 2002; Page, 2002; Canes-Wrone and Shotts, 2004;
Burstein, 2006; Alexandrova et al., 2016). The literature on politician responsiveness and
public opinion is divided. We attempt to explain the disparity in the expectations of
political accountability and the impact of public opinion on policy through an alternative
model of popularity for competing politicians.
This paper explores a setting wherein two competing politicians take a decision on an
issue. The decision is a trade-off between what she believes the electorate wants and
the decision in which she stands to receive a private benefit. Both politicians receive a
signal on the popular choice. We introduce a model of relative popularity, where the
performance of the incumbent is not measured independently, instead it is measured in
conjunction with the performance of her opponent. Depending on the policy rewards, the
level of private benefit, and the decision-making ability of the politicians, a coordination
or anti-coordination game is played.
The results show how a politician’s private interests and the electorate control, in the
form of popularity payoffs, affect policy outcomes. Large private benefits are found to
increase the propensity of politicians to follow the private option and become dishonest.
In terms of electorate controls, the results indicate that increasing the payoff for popular
policy implementation makes politicians more likely to follow the popular policy for both
salient and non-salient issues. However, an increased reward in policy implementation
when issues are non-salient provides incentives for politicians to collude and decide on one
decision without regard to the popular choice. Overall, the electorate is found to be better
off when politicians coordinate.
The paper focuses on an environment where politicians can be held directly accountable
for governmental outcomes. Popularity is used in place of the threat of nonre-election
in this model. To the best of my knowledge, the paper is the first to explore politician
accountability under a relative popularity framework. The static nature of the game
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provides an alternative perspective from which one can view last period performance. The
analysis with respect to decision-making ability and rent provides an additional perspective
on the selection of policy makers. As the politicians are already in office, the results look
at how different levels of public incentives affect both the implementation of a policy
and the type of policy implemented. The results also provide information under what
conditions policies are implemented. More importantly, the model provides insights on
how incumbents interact and if they can be induced to make good decisions regardless of
their abilities.
The model uses popularity as an incentive for politicians to follow public opinion, instead
of the threat of non-reelection used widely in existing studies on political accountability
(Barro, 1973; Ferejohn, 1986; Wattenberg, 2004; Rivas, 2013; Myatt, 2017). The notion
of popularity captures gains during and after holding office. It is another way to exercise
accountability through feedback, encompassing public perception on performance in office,
similar to retrospective voting. Evidence on retrospective voting at the state and national
levels has been mixed(Kenski, 1977; Abramowitz et al., 1988; Evans and Andersen, 2006),
but may be largely due to the focus on the effects of economic outcomes and inflation
rates Kenski (1977); Abramowitz et al. (1988); Evans and Andersen (2006). However, as
delegate representatives, the politicians in the model can be made accountable for their
actions. We focus on direct politician impact on policy outcomes in the paper. As delegate
representatives, the politicians in the model can be made accountable for their actions.
Tsai (2007) and Berry and Howell (2007) find increased responsiveness from office holders
when direct accountability is established. A study by Cleary (2007) in 2400 municipalities
in Mexico from 1989 to 2000 showed that the quality and responsiveness of the municipal
government depended more on the degree of citizen engagement rather than a threat of
non-reelection.
The model assumes that the politicians are expected by the electorate to act as delegate
representatives. We follow the definition of delegate representation by McCrone and Kuk-
linski (1979), where delegate representatives’ reflect the preferences of the constituents.
For voters to hold incumbents accountable for their past performance, it has to be mea-
sured in areas that incumbents oversee directly (Berry and Howell, 2007; Malhotra and
Margalit, 2014). By limiting the role of the politician to a delegate, the actions of politi-
cians faced with uncertainty on public sentiment and outside income sources can be better
studied. Existing literature have shown that voters do respond to the actions of politi-
cians in office. Healy and Malhotra (2010) used a tornado incident to study how politician
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perceptions are changed. The findings showed that voters do not blame incumbents for
the natural events, instead reward and punish politicians on how the incident is handled.
Besley and Burgess (2002) showed that the effects of public opinion in government respon-
siveness increases as media reach increases. The influence of public opinion on policy has
also been studied empirically, with the impact changing depending on issue salience and
possible competition (King, 2001; Wattenberg, 2004; Myatt, 2017)
The use of popularity also allows us to account for the gains a politician may have upon
leaving the seat of power. Politicians shift from having de jure to de facto power (Ace-
moglu et al., 2004). It is not unusual to observe a politician go through the “revolving
door of politics” (Fisman, 2001; Blanes i Vidal et al., 2012; Goldman et al., 2013; Cain
and Drutman, 2014; Luechinger and Moser, 2014). The connections politicians make in
office provide them with excellent opportunities post-incumbency as private firms tend
to benefit from high degrees of political-connectedness (Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Faccio,
2006; Ferguson and Voth, 2008). Prominent figures including previous prime minister of
the UK Tony Blair has faced criticism in his consultancy work that involved contact with
foreign leaders (Thompson, 2016). If one is perceived popular, de facto power is stronger,
providing increased access to both information and resources.
Public response is modeled through popularity-related payoffs for both salient and non-
salient issues. We consider the relative performance evaluation theory that suggests con-
tract efficiency can be improved by incorporating the performance of comparable agents
(Antle and Smith, 1986). I argue that relative performance evaluations can be observed
commonly in politics. The “Keeping up with the Joneses” perspective has been used
across different fields of study in economics (Gali, 1994; Easterlin, 1995; Ljungqvist and
Uhlig, 2000; Carlsson et al., 2007). We take the underlying process - wherein an individual
judges himself according to his relative performance against his peers, and use it in the
electorate’s evaluation of the performance of competing incumbents. Instead of measuring
the performance of politicians independently, a voter looks at a politician’s performance
in relation to the competing politician’s performance. More specifically, good politician
performance is highlighted when the competing politician performs poorly. Conversely,
bad performance is highlighted when the performance of the competing politician is good.
When the performance of both politicians are equally bad, or good, the perception of
ineffectiveness, or effectiveness, is downplayed.
We expect different outcomes depending on issue salience. When an issue is salient, a
politician who deviates from the popular choice, regardless of opponent action, is viewed
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ineffective. However, when an issue is non-salient, the public does not care too much
about the policy implemented, and only notices that a politician is ineffective if the op-
ponent chooses the popular action. The behaviour of politicians for non-salient issues
can be viewed in particular as an anti-coordination game. Under non-salient issues, a
politician who deviates from the popular choice still obtains popularity payoff from policy
implementation if the opponent also deviates from the popular choice.
Outside the gains from being popular, politicians can also receive payoffs directly from
the private sector. Although the negative impact on high private agenda or rent on
politician attitudes in office have been well documented (Krueger, 1974; Ferejohn, 1986;
Rivas, 2013; Di Tella and Franceschelli, 2011), corrupt politicians still manage to secure
re-election in more nascent democracies. In the Philippines, an ex-senator acquitted of
plunder and ordered by the courts to return approximately USD 2.4 million to the national
treasury is a front runner in the 2019 senatorial elections (Buan, 2019; PulseAsia, 2019).
In Brasil, despite the Mensalao scandal, ex-president Lula da Silva still left office with
huge approval ratings (BBC, 2012). The reason may be due to the fact that the impact of
corruption extends beyond the offending party. Chong et al. (2015) found that corruption
decreases voter turnout in general and drives down the support for both the incumbent
and challenging party. When all politicians are perceived corrupt, the electorate overlooks
information on corruption and looks at other indicators to assess quality(Svolik, 2013;
Pavo, 2018). This is reflected in the model, the electorate only takes into account how the
actions of the politician align with the popular choice and politicians are not punished for
taking the private benefit.
The results show how a politician’s private interests and the electorate control, in the form
of popularity payoffs, affect policy outcomes. Large private benefits are found to increase
the propensity of politicians to follow the private option and become dishonest. In terms
of electorate controls, the results indicate that increasing the payoff for popular policy
implementation makes politicians more likely to follow the popular policy for both salient
and non-salient issues. Our results corroborate the findings of Wattenberg (2004), Burstein
(2006), and Myatt (2017) where the impact of public opinion on policy is affected by issue
salience. The politicians are more likely to implement popular policies when issues are
salient. However, an increased reward in policy implementation when issues are non-salient
provides incentives for politicians to collude and decide on one decision without regard
to the popular choice. The paper finds that ultimately, better decision-making ability in
politicians makes it more likely for politicians to ignore the private benefit and follow the
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preferences of the electorate. Better decision-makers have more incentive to be honest as
there is less risk in getting the popular choice correctly. Empirical results in India show
that education increases the chances of selection to public office and makes politicians less
likely to be opportunistic in office (Besley et al., 2005). Overall, the electorate is found to
be better off when politicians coordinate.
The model can be used in settings where the actions of politicians can be directly attributed
to outcomes: policy implementation or the passing of legislation for legislators, and the
policy positioning of a coalition majority ruling party - such as the Conservative Party
and the Democratic Union Party (DUP) in the United Kingdom and Germanys Social
Democratic party (SPD), Christian Social Union of Bavaria (CSU) and the conservative
Christian Democratic Union (CDU). Increasing educational requirements in politicians
may lead to a more responsive government. Furthermore, reducing uncertainty on popular
choice, particulary in salient issues, through more active public participation can push for
the implementation of policies that benefit the public.
The rest of the paper covers the model in section 2, politician strategies in section 3, the
analysis of outcomes for both salient and non-salient issues in section 4, and concluding
remarks in section 5.
2 The Model
Consider a homogenous electorate. The state of nature, ω ∈ Ω = {0, 1}, represents the
popular decision, which is perceived to be optimal by the electorate. Both states are
equally likely.
Two incumbent politicians i ∈ {1, 2} have to decide on a policy. The electorate knows the
state of nature, but the politicians do not. Instead, politician i receives a signal θi ∈ {0, 1}
on the state of nature, with quality q. The quality of the signal, q ∈ [1/2, 1], represents
the decision-making ability of the politician, and can be characterized as follows.
P (θi = ω) = q
Bad decision makers have signal qualities close to 1/2 — a signal of q = 1/2 has the
accuracy of a random guess. The politicians have the same decision-making abilities and
are both aware of the quality of the signals received.
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Politicians decide on an action, ai ∈ Ai = {0, 1} simultaneously. A policy is implemented
when both politicians choose the same action. Politicians enjoy their popularity among
the electorate. The popularity of the incumbents depend on how their actions align with







if ai = ω and a−i 6= ω,
if ai = ω and a−i = ω,
if ai 6= ω and a−i 6= ω,
if ai 6= ω and a−i = ω
(1)
where, 1 ≥ T ≥ B ≥ 0.
Incumbent performance is judged in relative terms, with the electorate using the opposing
politician’s performance as a benchmark. In particular, the politician obtains the highest
payoff 1 when she chooses the popular decision and the opposing politician does not.
The electorate perceives the politician with the correct decision as the effective agent. In
contrast, the politician does not get an payoff when she chooses the wrong decision when
the opposing party chooses the popular decision. When the popular choice is implemented,
the politicians both receive a popularity payoff T , less than or equal what they would
have received if the electorate identifies them as the sole effective agent. The payoff
for implementing a policy that is not the popular choice provides both politicians with
utility B ≥ 0. As both politicians perform poorly, the bad performance is downplayed,
and the electorate may provide politicians a payoff for implementing a policy, albeit the
incorrect one. This however works only in issues that are non-salient. For salient issues,
the electorate only cares about the popular choice (B = 0).
Aside from popularity-related payoffs, a politician also receives payoff α if she takes the
private decision — the decision that coincides with the state where her private agenda
lies. The private choice is fixed at ω = 1 for both politicians, and is done without loss of
generality. We define the agenda payoff as:
piA =
 α0 if ai = 1,if ai = 0, (2)
where, α ≥ 0.
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The extensive game is illustrated below:
Figure 1: Extensive Form Game
Putting the popularity and private benefit payoffs together, the utility of a politician i is:










if ai = ω, a−i 6= ω and ω = 1,
if ai = ω, a−i 6= ω and ω = 0,
if ai = ω, a−i = ω and ω = 1,
if ai = ω, a−i = ω and ω = 0,
if ai 6= ω, a−i 6= ω and ω = 0
if ai 6= ω, a−i 6= ω and ω = 1
if ai 6= ω, a−i = ω and ω = 0
if ai 6= ω, a−i = ω and ω = 1
(3)






[P (ai = ω)(T P (a−i = ω) + P (a−i 6= ω))+ (4)
B P (ai 6= ω)P (a−i 6= ω) + αP (ai = 1)] (5)




The politicians can choose one of four strategies, σi ∈ Σ = {H, D, Z, C}, explained below:
 Honest (H): Politician i employs the strategy Honest if she follows her signal,
ai = θi, ∀ θi
 Dishonest (D): Politician i is Dishonest if she always chooses the decision in which
her private agenda lies, ai = 1, ∀ θi.
 Zero (Z): Politician i employs the strategy Zero if she always chooses ai = 0, ∀ θi
 Contrarian (C): Politician i is Contrarian if she always chooses the opposite of




i is different from the signal θi
The four strategies provide an exhaustive list of strategies available to politician i.
The strategy honest leads politicians to always choose what she believes is the popular
decision. The politician acts fully as a delegate. As the model does not provide expert
information, the politician is perceived to be honest in her pursuit of the policy that is
best for the public. The strategy pays off when the politician has good decision-making
abilities (i.e. the quality of the signal q high enough). Note that the popular decision
can also be the decision with the private benefit with a probability 1/2. Being honest is
also an attractive option as it does not exclude the politician from the private benefit. An
honest politician places a lot of stock in her popularity. Career politicians are most likely
to consistently subscribe to the strategy honest.
Under dishonest, a politician always chooses the private benefit option. The politician
acts without regard to public opinion, and tries to maximize out-of-office compensation.
Politicians who always choose to be dishonest can be viewed in parallel with final term
office holders, prioritizing popularity-related payoffs less than office-seeking politicians.
Although the dishonest politician chooses the decision with the private benefit, this does
not preclude her from reaping popularity payoffs as the decision with the private benefit
can be the popular decision with a probability 1/2.
A politician who chooses zero, always chooses the decision without the private benefit.
Similar to the strategy dishonest, a politician disregards public opinion. The probability
that the choice of the politician is the popular decision is always 1/2. A politician who
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always chooses the decision without the private benefit can be viewed as one with a very
strong policy preference.
Under contrarian, a politician always chooses differently from the signal θi. It is unlikely to
observe a politician following this strategy, but we have included the strategy to provide
an exhaustive list of all possible strategies. We show in Appendix C that the strategy
contrarian is strictly dominated by the strategy honest.
Lemma 1. The strategy Contrarian (C) is strictly dominated by Honest (H)
The Contrarian strategy, choosing the action opposite the signal received, is a strictly
dominated strategy for all potential opponent strategies. Under the strategy C, the prob-
ability that the action chosen is the state is 1 − q. Recall that the quality of signal θ,
q, ranges from 1/2 to 1. From this, we know 1 − q ∈ [0, 1/2]. The odds of making the
right choice under this strategy, 1 − q, are very small. Furthermore, the decision where
the private benefit lies is not prioritized. A rational politician with poor decision making
abilities (i.e. q = 1/2) is indifferent between H and C, but is assumed to always chose to
be honest. At very poor decision-making abilities, rational individuals would more likely
prefer to follow the decision where their private benefit lies to maximize their utility. The
popularity payoff from H, dependent on the probability of making the right choice, q is
always higher than the corresponding payoff under C, while the expected private benefit
α/2 is the same for both. As players always prefer strategy H over C regardless of op-
ponent strategies, C is never chosen as a best response, making it a strictly dominated
strategy.
After eliminating the strictly dominated strategy, Contrarian (C), only nine strategy pro-
files remain. A strategy profile (σi, σ−i) is denoted by the strategies of politicians 1 and
2 side by side (e.g. (H, H) = HH). Policies are only implemented when both politi-
cians choose the same strategy. Only three strategy profiles yield policy outcomes. The
remaining profiles retain the status quo.
4 Analysis
We use the following definitions of Best Responses and Nash Equilibrium in this paper.
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Definition. Best Response
BRi(σ−i) = σi ∈ Σ : EU1(σi, σ−i) ≥ EU1(σ′i, σ−i) for all σ′i ∈ Σ
Definition. Nash Equilibrium
σ∗ = (σ∗1, σ∗2) ∈ P is a Nash Equilibrium if σ∗i ∈ BRi(σ∗−i) for every i ∈ N
The analysis performed looks at two possible cases: one for non-salient issues (T = B)
and another for salient issues (B = 0). Both outcomes allow for the focus to be primarily
on whether or not policies are implemented given the trade offs politicians face with their
private benefit. The best responses and equilibrium outcomes are explored for each case,
and the impact of each parameter is then performed. All the derivations can be found in
full in the appendix. Only the final results are shown in subsequent analysis.
Let BRi(σ−i) ⊂ Σ be the set of player is best response bids against σ−i ∈ Σ. We begin
with the determination of best responses for the three remaining strategies, honest (H),
dishonest (D), and zero (Z), for non-salient issues.
4.1 Non-Salient Issues
When the issue is non-salient (T = B), the electorate is indifferent to the policy imple-
mented. The issue is not of high relevance to the electorate but one where is a general
consensus towards the correct decision, for example the mandatory allocation of unsold
food from groceries to charities in France. The law or its variations do not directly affect
the public, and a policy maker is still found to be effective if the other politician acts
in a similar manner. The absence of distinction between electorate responses under the
implementation of popular and non-popular policies can be observed in issues of little
public relevance. The policy implementation payoffs in this case are equal, B = T . The
electorate rewards the politicians a certain value T if a policy is implemented. The same
value is awarded regardless if the enacted policy matches the popular decision. If the
politicians choose opposite actions, only then does choosing the popular decision provide
a larger benefit.
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Best Responses For Non-Salient Issues (B = T )
When σ−i = H
BRi(H) =






Recall from (1), the payoff of implementing the popular policy (ai = a−i = ω) is given
by T , and the payoff for implementing the wrong policy (ai = a−i 6= ω) is given by B.
As the issue is non-salient, the issues have no direct impact on the electorate. As long as
a policy is implemented, a politician is perceived to be as effective as their competitors,
with both politicians receiving T , as B = T . As T increases, the appeal of matching the
opponent decision’s increases. Looking at the threshold value for best response honest
(H) when σ−i = H, we find that the constraint (1−q)/(1−2q)+α/(1−2q)2 relaxes when
q < 0.5 + 2α. Recall that q ∈ [1/2, 1]. When α ≥ 0.25, q always satisfies the constraint,
making the constraint relax as α increases. As q increases, the area where honest is a best
response increases. Improving the decision-making ability of the politician leads to higher
payoffs for the strategy honest, making it a more attractive option. A politician with very
poor decision-making ability (i.e. q = 1/2) never chooses to be honest. As the accuracy
of the strategy honest is very low, the payoff from the private decision, α, becomes more
attractive, leading the politician to choose to be dishonest (D).






if T ≥ q − α,
if 1− q − α ≤ T ≤ q − α,
otherwise
Matching the strategy dishonest (D) with dishonesty is a best response only when the
payoff from policy implementationT is sufficiently high. As the decision-making ability q
improves, the expected utility of choosing honest (H) increases, making dishonesty less
attractive. The strategy H is only the best response when the incentive of matching
opponent decision is not too high. However, if the T is sufficiently low given q and α,
the politician capitalizes on the fact that each state is equally likely to be the popular
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decision and always choose the opposite decision and follow strategy zero (Z). Note
however that when the politician chooses strategy zero (Z), the private benefit is forgone.
As the decision-making ability of the politician q improves, choosing the opposing decision
Z becomes less attractive as a best response, and politicians move to other options that
allow for the private benefit payoffs to be reaped.






if T ≥ q + α,
if 1− q + α ≤ T ≤ 0.5 + α,
otherwise.
As observed previously, at a sufficiently high level of policy implementation payoff T ,
matching the opponent’s decision becomes the best response. For very low levels of T ,
and subsequently at low levels of q, being dishonest (D) is the best response. When the
payoffs from policy implementation are low, politicians with low levels of decision making
ability are better off taking opposing positions to increase the odds of solely choosing the
popular decision, and securing the highest level of popularity payoff.
From the best responses above, we obtain the bayesian Nash equilibrium, stated in Propo-
sition 1.
Proposition 1. For non-salient issues (B = T )
1. If T ≥ 1−q1−2q + α(1−2q)2 , there exists an equilibrium HH,
2. If T ≥ q − α, there exists an equilibrium DD,
3. If T ≥ q + α, there exists an equilibrium ZZ,
4. If T < 1− q − α, there exists two possible equilibria, ZD or DZ,
5. If T < 1−q1−2q +
α
(1−2q)2 and
1− q − α < T < q − α, there exists two possible equilibria HD or DH.
Whether or not policies are passed depends on the decision-making abilities of the politi-
cians and the size of their private benefit. Amongst all equilibrium conditions, only equi-
libria with at least one politician choosing the strategy dishonest (D) have constraints that
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relax as α increases (See point 2 of Proposition 1). Unsurprisingly, an increase in the size
of the private benefit steers politicians from following the popular decision and decreases
the likelihood for the popular policy to be passed. The higher the private benefit, the
propensity for dishonesty increases.
From point 1 of Proposition 1, it is evident that as q increases, the higher the accuracy of
the signal, the higher the payoffs for strategy H, making it more attractive for politicians.
However, the conditions that underscore honesty as a stable equilibrium appear to be
more complex than the conditions for dishonesty. The results state that the clearer the
public opinion is on an issue, the more likely it is for politicians to take note of the popular
opinion in the policy formation process.
In general, increasing policy implementation payoff T increases the chances of a policy
being passed. However, as the electorate is assumed to be indifferent between policies
(B = T ), the popular policy is not always implemented. We find from point 3 of the
Proposition 1 that at extremely high rewards on policy implementation and a sufficiently
small private benefit, the politicians both choose strategy zero (Z), implementing a policy
that is neither popular nor provides a private benefit. Despite the low private benefit
payoff, the high policy implementation payoff provides both politicians to shirk and coor-
dinate to implement a policy without regard to their signal q. Politicians may cease to
follow what the electorate wants as they are rewarded for their decisions despite the im-
plementation of subpar policies. We observe that politicians with lower decision- making
abilities are more susceptible to this behaviour than better decision-makers.
Furthermore, when politicians with poor decision-making abilities are faced with low policy
implementation payoffs, and a small private benefit, the politicians choose to implement a
policy that is not in line with the private benefit. Both politicians can decide to ensure that
they both get the payoff for policy implementation T , when the alternative offered by the
private sector is not sufficiently high. As their decision-making ability is poor, the decision
to employ strategy honest is risky as politicians may end up with no popularity-related
payoffs.
For non-salient issues, a policy is always implemented if the policy implementation payoff,
T , is greater than 1/2. It is useful to note that as the payoffs for implementing a popular
and non-popular policy are the same (i.e. T=B), we expect for a higher level of coordi-
nation between the lobbyists. Looking at all equilibrium conditions in Proposition 1, an
increase in the policy implementation payoff makes all pooling equilibria more likely. One
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would assume that with sufficiently low policy implementation rewards, politicians would
prioritize their private benefit regardless of its amount - leading to the implementation of
suboptimal policy decisions. However, we observe in this model that no policy is imple-
mented when both the policy and private benefit incentives are very low. As politicians
do not have much to gain from jointly choosing the popular choice, one chooses the option
with the private agenda, while the other maximizes her expected utility by capitalizing on
her opponent’s dishonesty. By choosing the remaining option (i.e. ai = 0), the opponent
increases her odds of being identified as the sole effective agent. Similarly at low policy
rewards, good enough decision-makers with moderate private benefits find themselves di-
verging in strategies with one being dishonest and securing the private agenda values, and
the other capitalizing on the other’s dishonesty by following what she believes to be the
popular decision.
In order to get a better understanding of the results, the equilibria for non-salient issues
is shown in Figure 2.
4.2 Salient Issues
When the issue is salient, the electorate rewards politicians for implementing a policy only
when it is optimal. Salient issues are often on a larger scale, for example taxation and
health care, and affect the population directly. The implementation of a non-popular policy
is equivalent to choosing the wrong action when the opposing politician has chosen the
popular decision. The electorate’s support is less flexible compared to non-salient issues.
The implementation of an optimal policy yields politicians a payoff T each, otherwise no
payoff is received, B = 0.
Best Responses For Salient Issues (B = 0)
When σ−i = H
BRi(H) =




Politicians only obtain payoffs when the popular decision matches their action, ai = ω.
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(a) At q = 0.5 (b) At q = 0.67
(c) At = 0.83 (d) At q =1
Figure 2: Illustration of Equilibria for Non-Salient Issues
As T increases, the strategy honest (H) becomes more attractive. Furthermore, as the
decision-making ability increases, the constraint (α + 2q2 − 3q + 1)/(2q2 − q) relaxes.
Politicians with better decision-making abilities are more likely respond to honesty with
honesty. When decision-making ability is poor, the politician is better off taking the
strategy dishonest (D), securing private benefit and a fifty percent chance of obtaining
the maximum popularity payoff 1.






if T ≥ q−α1−q ,
if 1−q−αq ≤ T ≤ q−α1−q ,
otherwise
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Similar to the case where the issue is non-salient (T = B), matching the strategy dishonest
(D) with dishonest as a best response only occurs when the payoff from implementing the
popular policy, T is sufficiently high, despite no rewards for the implementation of the
wrong policy, B = 0. However, for salient issues, the minimum policy implementation for
dishonest to be a best response is much higher. Comparing the two constraints, it can be
observed that constraint for dishonest to best respond to dishonesty under salient issues
is 1/(1 − q) times of the constraint under non-salient issues. Improved decision-making
ability q makes the strategy honest more attractive. As before, if both the poular policy
implementation payoff T and private benefit α are low enough (i.e. α ≤ 1−q), and decision
making ability is poor, the politician best responds by choosing the opposite decision with
strategy zero (Z) and secure the maximum popularity payoff of 1 with a probability 1/2.
When σ−i = Z
BRi(Z) =
 HD if T ≥ 1 + α,otherwise
The popular policy implementation payoff T needs to be sufficiently high for strategy
zero (Z) to be the best response for strategy zero. However, as politicians are only re-
warded when the correct decision is chosen or implemented as policy, it does not make
sense for the politicians to coordinate and implement a policy without regard to the signal
and no private benefit. The politician is better off being honest (H) when the payoff for
implementing the popular policy is sufficiently high. At very low levels of policy imple-
mentation payoffs, politicians with poor decision making-skills obtain more by choosing
to be dishonest (D) and taking the private benefit.
Proposition 2. For salient issues (B = 0),
1. If T ≥ α+2q2−3q+1
2q2−q , there exists an equilibrium HH,
2. If T ≥ q−α1−q , there exists an equilibrium DD,
3. If T < 1−q−αq , there exists two equilibria ZD or DZ,




q ≤ T ≤ q−α1−q , there exists two equilibria HD or DH.
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When issues are salient, the area where policy implementation is an equilibrium is smaller.
The minimum payoffs for the implementation of the popular policy T required to observe
coordination among politicians for all three strategies honest, dishonest, and zero, are
higher compared to those under non-salient issues. As policy implementation only pays
when the popular choice is implemented in salient issues, the higher policy payoff is nec-
essary to compensate for the lower probability of securing popularity through policy. The
certainty of a policy being implemented at sufficiently high levels of T now disappears
as there is no gain to be made in passing suboptimal policy. As expected increasing the
popular policy implementation payoff increases the chance of the popular policy to be
implemented. Increased awareness and scrutiny from the electorate on politician actions
have an effect on the type of policies implemented.
As only optimal choices are rewarded when issues are salient, pooling at ZZ, where both
politicians settle on the action without the private benefit, provides a very low payoff.
The action Z only comes into equilibrium in when the opposing politician chooses to
be dishonest with both policy implementation payoffs and the private benefit sufficiently
low. Politicians are better off trying to appear as the effective agent under this scenario
and chooses the opposite of her opponent’s action. When the decision making ability of
politicians improves, this equilibrium becomes less likely, and politicians gravitate toward
the strategy H.
Proposition 2 is illustrated in Figure 3.
4.3 Variations in Popularity-Related Payoffs
Although an increase in popularity-related payoffs increases the likelihood of honesty and
subsequently the passing of popular policies, when there is no difference in the payoffs
across different policy types, the room for politicians to ignore the wishes of the electorate
also expands. When issues are non-salient, politicians are faced with different options to
accumulate benefit, and choosing to follow their signal on the popular choice could be risky.
It is not unlikely to see results that veer away from the popular law being passed. This
corroborates existing empirical results that the salience of the issue has a direct impact
on the influence of public opinion in policy (Wattenberg, 2004; Myatt, 2017). Consider
the equilibrium ZZ, bad decision-makers implement a policy without any private agenda
to secure very high popularity payoffs when the private benefits are very low. A possible
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(a) At q = 0.5 (b) At q = 0.67
(c) At = 0.83 (d) At q =1
Figure 3: Illustration of Equilibria for Salient Issues
explanation for this is put forward by Burstein (2006) in his study of the effect of public
opinion on random proposals within the US house of congress. Burstein (2006) found that
the impact of public opinion is considerably less than previous statistical studies on the
subject , summarized by (Page, 2002), but posits that this may be due to the public not
having strong opinions, leaving room for organized interests to win.
One way to induce honesty is to distinguish between the implementation of policies that
are popular and those that are not. Recall that for salient issues, B = 0. This represents
the extreme case where there are no payoffs in policy unless it coincides with the popular
choice. The multiplicity of equilibria observed when issues are non-salient disappears when
we impose the condition that only the implementation of popular policy is implemented.
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4.4 Variations in Private Benefit
Regardless of issue salience, an increase in private agenda-related payoffs unambiguously
increase the politician’s propensity to be dishonest. As the private gains increase relative
to the rewards one stands to gain from passing a law, a rational individual tries harder
to secure the private benefit. The result that an increase in the private gains available
induces dishonesty amongst elected officials is not unexpected. Despite this, the increase
in the likelihood of both politicians choosing dishonesty is tempered by higher levels of
decision-making ability. Although the maximum value obtainable in the popularity-related
payoffs is capped at one, values of α > 1 are allowed. At α = 1, the politician immediately
chooses to be dishonest regardless of T , and is carried over for all private benefit values
above that of the popularity payoffs.
4.5 Variations in Decision Making Ability
An increase in decision making ability reduces the minimum required policy implementa-
tion payoff T for honesty as an equilibrium strategy for both politicians, while increasing
thresholds for dishonest and zero strategies. Decision-making ability is defined by the
quality of the signal received. The quality of the signal received can encompass the in-
nate abilities of the politician and the resources the politician has to gather information
on public opinion. Unlike changes in the rewards of policy implementation, the increase
in decision-making ability singularly pushes for the implementation of popular choices.
Better decision-makers have more incentive to be honest as there is less risk in getting
the popular choice correctly. Empirical results in India show that education increases the
chances of selection to public office and makes politicians less likely to be opportunistic in
office (Besley et al., 2005). This also supports the findings by Besley et al. (2011) where
growth is higher when leaders are highly educated. The effect of decision-making ability
on the selection of honest equilibrium strategies is more pronounced when the issue is more
salient. As the electorate does not reward the suboptimal policies, politicians are more
careful with their actions, and avoid passing policies without the private benefit when no
information on the popular decision is available.
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4.6 Analysis of Voter Welfare
The implementation of the popular policy improves voter welfare. The popular choice
embodies the voter’s choice. Recall that in our model, the electorate knows what is best
for them. The voter welfare is measured by the probability that a popular policy is
implemented under each possible pair of actions in equilibrium.
We summarize these probabilities in the table below.
Voter Welfare






When the decision making ability of the incumbents is poor, the electorate worse off when
both politicians are honest than dishonest. However, once the decision-making ability of
the politicians become sufficiently good (q ≥ 0.71), the electorate welfare is always the
highest when both politicians are honest. The welfare to the voters for the implementation
of policy without regard to the popular decision is 1/2, which is simply the probability of
the popular decision occurring. It can be observed that for all possible equilibrium pairs,
pooling equilibria always provide higher welfare to the voter, as q ∈ [1/2, 1], and voters
are worse off when the politicians do not coordinate.
5 Conclusion
The paper explores a setting wherein two competing politicians decide on a policy. The
decision requires the politician to consider the trade offs between following the popu-
lar choice and the private agenda option. Politicians receive a signal on the uncertain
popular choice. We introduce a model of relative popularity: where the performance of
the politician is benchmarked by the performance of her opponent. Depending on the
policy rewards, the private benefit, and the decision-making ability of the politicians, a
coordination or anti-coordination game is played.
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Through a model of relative popularity, we find how a politician’s private interests and
public opinion affect policy outcomes. Higher payoffs from the private sectors increases
the propensity of politicians to become dishonest. Increasing rewards on popular policy
implementation increases the propensity of politicians to be honest regardless of issue
salience. However, without distinction in policy implementation rewards, politicians find
an incentive to collude and decide on one decision without regard to the popular choice.
Introducing a distinction between optimal and suboptimal policies helps delineate the
strategies better and implement optimal policy choices. Furthermore, an increased re-
quirement in decision-making of politicians pushes towards the implementation of popular
policies. It is possible to curb dishonest behavior and induce honest behaviour by in-
creasing public regard on successful law implementation and a stronger perception on
implementing the choices of a well-informed electorate.
We aim to provide another perspective on politician behaviour. By considering relative
popularity, the model explores how politicians measure their responses given the actions of
their opponent. The impact of re-election, and the introduction of a distinction between
socially optimal and popular choices will be interesting to explore as future extensions to
the model. The model can also be extended to multi-issue platforms with varying degrees
of salience to find out when and where politicians compromise under a wide selection of
issues that they are accountable for.
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A Expected Utility Values when B = T








(T P (ai = ω)P (a−i = ω) + P (ai = ω)P (a−i 6= ω)+
B P (ai 6= ω)P (a−i 6= ω)] + αP (ai = 1)
Recall that payoffs do not differ according to the policy implemented, B = T , and the
each state is equally likely, P (ω = 0) = P (ω = 1) = 12 .
Expected Utility of Player 1 when σi = σ−i = H
EU1(H,H) = P [ω = 0]X + P [ω = 1]Y





P (ai = ω)
q︸︷︷︸
P (a−i = ω|ω = 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸




P (ai = ω)
(1− q)︸ ︷︷ ︸
P (a−i 6= ω|ω = 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ai = ω 6= a−i
+ T︸︷︷︸
piPi
(1− q)︸ ︷︷ ︸
P (ai 6= ω)
(1− q)︸ ︷︷ ︸
P (a−i 6= ω|ω = 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸




(1− q)︸ ︷︷ ︸




P (ai = ω)
q︸︷︷︸
P (a−i = ω|ω = 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸




P (ai = ω)
(1− q)︸ ︷︷ ︸
P (a−i 6= ω|ω = 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ai = ω 6= a−i
+ T︸︷︷︸
piPi
(1− q)︸ ︷︷ ︸
P (ai 6= ω)
(1− q)︸ ︷︷ ︸
P (a−i 6= ω|ω = 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸





P (ai = 1)
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The remaining expected utilities are computed in a similar fashion:
EU1(H,D) = 0.5q + 0.5T + 0.5α
EU1(H,Z) = 0.5q + 0.5T + 0.5α
EU1(H,C) = q
2(1 − 2T ) + 2qT + 0.5α
EU1(D,H) = 0.5− 0.5q + 0.5T + α
EU1(D,D) = T + α
EU1(D,Z) = 0.5 + α
EU1(D,C) = 0.5q + 0.5T + α
EU1(Z,H) = 0.5− 0.5q + 0.5T
EU1(Z,D) = 0.5
EU1(Z,Z) = T
EU1(Z,C) = 0.5q + 0.5T
EU1(C,H) = 1 + q
2(1 − 2T ) + 2q(T − 1) + 0.5α
EU1(C,D) = 0.5(1− q) + 0.5T + 0.5α
EU1(C,Z) = 0.5(1− q) + 0.5T + 0.5α
EU1(C,C) = q
2(2T − 1)− q(2T − 1) + T + 0.5α
As the players are symmetric, the corresponding strategy combinations yields the same
expected utility values (e.g. EU1(H,D) = EU2(D,H)).
38
B Expected Utility Values when B = 0






(T P (ai = ω)P (a−i = ω) + P (ai = ω)P (a−i 6= ω)+
αP (ai = 1)
The expected utility functions are computed similarly with the previous case, and are
shown as follows:
EU1(H,H) = q
2(T − 1) + q + 0.5α
EU1(H,D) = 0.5q(T + 1) + 0.5α
EU1(H,Z) = 0.5q(T + 1) + 0.5α
EU1(H,C) = q(q + T − qT ) + 0.5α
EU1(D,H) = 0.5q(T − 1) + 0.5 + α
EU1(D,D) = 0.5T + α
EU1(D,Z) = 0.5 + α
EU1(D,C) = 0.5(q + T − qT ) + α
EU1(Z,H) = 0.5q(T − 1) + 0.5
EU1(Z,D) = 0.5
EU1(Z,Z) = 0.5T
EU1(Z,C) = 0.5((1− q)T + q)
EU1(C,H) = q
2(1− T ) + q(T − 2) + 1 + 0.5α
EU1(C,D) = 0.5T + q(−0.5T − 0.5) + 0.5 + 0.5α
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EU1(C,Z) = 0.5T + q(−0.5T − 0.5) + 0.5 + 0.5α
EU1(C,C) = q(q(T − 1)− T + 1) + (1− q)T + 0.5α
As the players are symmetric, the corresponding strategy combinations yields the same
expected utility values (e.g. EU1(H,D) = EU2(D,H)).
40
C Proof of Lemma 1
Definition. Strictly Dominated Strategies





i , σ−i) > EUi(σ
′
i, σ−i) for every list σ−i of the other players’ strategies.
The strategy σ′i is strictly dominated.
Expected Utilities for strategies H and C are compared for all possible opponent strategies.
Only player one values are used in the proof as the players are symmetric.
Note that at q = 1/2 the expected utilities for H and C are equal. We assume that the
politician i always chooses H in this scenario.
 HH vs CH
EU1(H,H) > EU1(C,H)
T + q(1− 2T )− q2(1− 2T ) + 0.5α > 1 + q2(1 − 2T ) + 2q(T − 1) + 0.5α
T + q(1− 2T )− 2q2(1− 2T ) > 1 + 2q(T − 1)
T + 3q − 4qT − 2q2(1− 2T )− 1 > 0
T (1− 4q) + 4q2T > 2q2 − 3q + 1




T ≥ 0.5 + 0.25
0.5 − q
Recall that q ∈ [12 , 1]. As q approaches 1, the T threshold, 0.5 + 0.250.5−q , becomes less








0.5 − q = −∞
q = 1 : 0.5 +
0.25
0.5 − 1 = 0
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The threshold function 0.5 + 0.250.5−q is continuously differentiable in the interval q ∈
[12 , 1], and is monotonically increasing. As the maximum threshold value is 0 at
q = 1, it follows for all permissible values of q, we find that T satisfies the threshold
condition as 0 ≤ T ≤ 1. Therefore, EU1(H,H) > EU1(C,H).
 HD vs CD
EU1(H,D) > EU1(C,D)
0.5q + 0.5T + 0.5α > 0.5(1− q) + 0.5T + 0.5α
q > 1− q
As q > 1 − q when q 6= 1/2, and politician i always chooses H when q = 1/2,
EU1(H,D) > EU1(C,D).
 HZ vs CZ
EU1(H,Z) > EU1(C,Z)
0.5q + 0.5T + 0.5α > 0.5(1− q) + 0.5T + 0.5α
q > 1− q
As q > 1 − q when q 6= 1/2, and politician i always chooses H when q = 1/2,
EU1(H,Z) ≥ EU1(C,Z).
 HC vs CC
EU1(H,C) > EU1(C,C)
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q2(1 − 2T ) + 2qT + 0.5α > q2(2T − 1)− q(2T − 1) + T + 0.5α
2q2(1 − 2T ) + 4qT − T > q
−4q2T + 4qT − T > q − 2q2
−T (4q2 − 4q + 1) > q − 2q2











2q − 1 =∞
q = 1 :
q
2q − 1 = 1
The threshold function q2q−1 is continuously differentiable in the interval q ∈ [12 , 1], and is
monotonically decreasing. As the minimum threshold value is 1 at q = 1, it follows for
all permissible values of q, we find that T satisfies the threshold condition as 0 ≤ T ≤ 1.
Therefore, EU1(H,C) > EU1(C,C).
We have demonstrated in the above that the Contrarian strategy C is strictly dominated by
strategy H, when B = T . For B = 0, no payoffs are obtained for choosing the suboptimal
choice. As the probability of choosing the popular decision is always higher in H than in
C, it follows that all expected utilities under H isalways be greater than those under C,
holding σ−i constant. Therefore, the Contrarian strategy C is also strictly dominated by
strategy H when B = 0.
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D Derivation of Best Responses when B = T
The best responses are obtained for each of the three remaining strategies: Σi = {H, D, Z}.
All calculations shown arerepresentative of the expected utility of any player i ∈ 1, 2.
When σ−i = H
EU1(H,H) = T + q(1− 2T )− q2(1− 2T ) + 0.5α
EU1(D,H) = 0.5− 0.5q + 0.5T + α
EU1(Z,H) = 0.5− 0.5q + 0.5T
For all possible combinations of T , q, and α, EU1(D,H) ≥ EU1(Z,H). Looking for T
values where EU1(H,H) ≥ EU1(D,H),
EU1(H,H) ≥ EU1(D,H)
T + q(1− 2T )− q2(1− 2T ) + 0.5α ≥ 0.5− 0.5q + 0.5T + α
0.5T − 2qT + 2q2T ≥ 0.5− 1.5q + 0.5α+ q2
0.5T (1− 2q)2 ≥ 0.5− 1.5q + 0.5α+ q2
T ≥ 1− 3q + 2q
2 + α
(1− 2q)2
T ≥ (1− q)(1− 2q) + α
(1− 2q)2




The best responses for σ−i = H are given as follows:
BRi(H) =







When σ−i = D
EU1(H,D) = 0.5q + 0.5T + 0.5α
EU1(D,D) = T + α
EU1(Z,D) = 0.5
Three threshold conditions are necessary to determine the set of best responses for σ−i = D
EU1(D,D) ≥ EU1(H,D)
T + α ≥ 0.5q + 0.5T + 0.5α
0.5T ≥ 0.5q − 0.5α
T ≥ q − α
EU1(H,D) ≥ EU1(Z,D)
0.5q + 0.5T + 0.5α ≥ 0.5
0.5T ≥ 0.5− 0.5q − 0.5α
T ≥ 1− q − α
EU1(D,D) ≥ EU1(Z,D)
T + α ≥ 0.5
T ≥ 0.5− α






if T ≥ q − α,
if 1− q − α ≤ T ≤ q − α,
otherwise
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When σ−i = Z
EU1(H,Z) = 0.5q + 0.5T + 0.5α
EU1(D,Z) = 0.5 + α
EU1(Z,Z) = T
Three threshold conditions are necessary to determine the set of best reponses for σ−i = Z
EU1(H,Z) ≥ EU1(D,Z)
0.5q + 0.5T + 0.5α ≥ 0.5 + α
0.5T ≥ 0.5 + 0.5α− 0.5q
T ≥ 1− q + α
EU1(Z,Z) ≥ EU1(D,Z)
T ≥ 0.5 + α
EU1(Z,Z) ≥ EU1(H,Z)
T ≥ 0.5q + 0.5T + 0.5α
0.5T ≥ 0.5q + 0.5α
T ≥ q + α






if T ≥ q + α,
if 1− q + α ≤ T ≤ 0.5 + α,
otherwise.
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E Derivation of Best Responses when B = 0
When σ−i = H
EU1(H,H) = q
2(T − 1) + q + 0.5α
EU1(D,H) = 0.5q(T − 1) + 0.5 + α
EU1(Z,H) = 0.5q(T − 1) + 0.5
For all possible combinations of T , q, and α, EU1(D,H) ≥ EU1(Z,H). Looking for T
values where EU1(H,H) ≥ EU1(D,H),
EU1(H,H) ≥ EU1(D,H)
q2(T − 1) + q + 0.5α ≥ 0.5q(T − 1) + 0.5 + α
q2T − 0.5qT ≥ 0.5α+ q2 − 1.5q + 0.5
0.5T (2q2 − q) ≥ 0.5α+ q2 − 1.5q + 0.5
T ≥ α+ 2q
2 − 3q + 1
2q2 − q
The best responses for σ−i = H are given as follows:
BRi(H) =




When σ−i = D
EU1(H,D) = 0.5q(T + 1) + 0.5α
EU1(D,D) = 0.5T + α
EU1(Z,D) = 0.5
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The T conditions where strategy σi provides higher payoffs than σ
′
i given σ−i = D are as
follows:
EU1(D,D) ≥ EU1(H,D)
0.5T + α ≥ 0.5q(T + 1) + 0.5α
T ≥ q(T + 1)− α
T (1− q) ≥ q − α
T ≥ q − α
1− q
EU1(H,D) ≥ EU1(Z,D)
0.5q(T + 1) + 0.5α ≥ 0.5
qT + q ≥ 1− α
T ≥ 1− q − α
q
EU1(D,D) ≥ EU1(Z,D)
0.5T + α ≥ 0.5
T ≥ 1− 2α






if T ≥ q−α1−q ,
if 1−q−αq ≤ T ≤ q−α1−q ,
otherwise
Note that 1−q−αq ≤ 1− 2α, ∀q.
When σ−i = Z
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EU1(H,Z) = 0.5q(T + 1) + 0.5α
EU1(D,Z) = 0.5 + α
EU1(Z,Z) = 0.5T
As before, the conditions where σi provides higher payoffs than σ
′
i given σ−i = D are
shown below:
EU1(H,Z) ≥ EU1(D,Z)
0.5q(T + 1) + 0.5α ≥ 0.5 + α
q(T + 1) ≥ 1 + α
T ≥ 1− q + α
q
EU1(Z,Z) ≥ EU1(D,Z)
0.5T ≥ 0.5 + α
T ≥ 1 + 2α
EU1(Z,Z) ≥ EU1(H,Z)
0.5T ≥ 0.5q(T + 1) + 0.5α
0.5T (1− q) ≥ 0.5q + 0.5α
T ≥ q + α
1− q






if T ≥ q+α1−q ,
if 1 + α ≤ T < q+α1−q ,
otherwise
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Note that, for q ≥ 12 , q+α1−q ≥ 1. As T ≤ 1, BRi(Z) = Z is not feasible. The final BRi(Z)
function is givent below:
BRi(Z) =
 HD if T ≤ 1 + α,otherwise
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Incumbent Competition and Pandering
Anne Marie Go *
Abstract
Two politicians choose an action to maximize popularity with only partial infor-
mation on the popular choice – the choice preferred by the public, and the socially-
optimal choice – the choice that maximizes public welfare. Although choosing the
popular choice increases the popularity of politicians, pandering costs can be incurred
when the socially optimal choice is revealed to be different from the popular choice.
The paper looks at the types of policies passed for salient issues – issues for which
following the popular choice provides higher payoffs, and non-salient issues – issues
for which the popular choice does not always provide higher payoffs, given different
levels of clarity on public opinion. We find that for salient issues, a divided public
is better than a united but ill-informed one. For non-salient issues, policies are al-
ways passed when public opinion is clear, while politicians diverge strategically under
low policy payoffs when public opinion is unclear. The model provides insights on
when pandering is observed and what policies are formed under a relative popularity
framework.
JEL Classication: D72, C79
*Department of Economics, University of Bath; Email: a.go@bath.ac.uk
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1 Introduction
Within most representative democracies, the gains associated with positions of power make
the decision to pander — to follow the public opinion regardless of reason— attractive. The
decision to pander becomes more difficult when public sentiment does not align with expert
opinion. Politicians perform a delicate balancing act between keeping their constituents
happy and choosing what they believe is best for the public to lead the popularity race.
Critical questions need to be explored to understand politician positions in policy: When
the preference of the public does not align with what the politicians believe to be socially
optimal, does the politician still follow the public choice? Under what conditions does
pandering occur? If there is uncertainty on public choice, do politicians follow what they
think is socially-optimal? Does the importance of the issue change politician behaviour
and the corresponding policy outcomes?
In this paper, a model of relative popularity is used to study two politicians who have to
decide on policy actions given beliefs on both popular and socially optimal choices. With
relative popularity, a politician’s actions may be perceived better or worse in conjunction
to the actions of the opponent. Each politician has a signal on the uncertain popular
choice and a signal on the uncertain socially optimal choice. The paper focuses on the
case where the public knows the popular choice but not the socially optimal choice. The
actions of the politicians are revealed to the public, and the public rewards politicians
when they follow the popular choice. We define a pandering politician as one who always
follows the popular choice regardless of her information on the socially-optimal state. The
public perceives a politician to be pandering if she is rewarded for choosing the popular
action and the socially optimal choice is revealed to be different from the popular choice.
The setup allows us to explore pandering under salient and non-salient issues, at varying
levels of information on public opinion, pandering costs and policy payoffs.
The paper finds that uncertainty in the public opinion on issues lead politicians to take
divergent positions to maximize the chance of being identified as the most effective agent.
The results show that the salience of the issue affects the implementation and the type of
policy outcome. Issue salience captures how important the issue is to the public. Non-
salient issues, such as deregulations in finance or voter identification, are covered less in
the media, and do not have a strong effect the popularity of the politicians. Salient issues,
such as hot button issues, are perceived to be more important to the public, and strongly
affects the popularity of politicians.
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When the popular choice is uncertain and the issue is non-salient, very high popularity
rewards on policy implementation lead politicians to implement any policy regardless of
public opinion and welfare. When the popular choice is uncertain and the issue is salient,
the game unfolds similarly to that of an anti-coordination game. Politicians choose to
strategically diverge unless the pandering costs are extremely high. The likelihood of each
option being the socially optimal choice does not affect the policies implemented in both
salient and non-salient issues. The only impact is the type of divergence in positions taken
if no policy is implemented. When the popular choice is clear, different policy results
appear. Pandering is widely observed under this scenario. Salient issues push politicians
towards pandering when private information is accurate. Politicians who do not pander
obtain no payoff, leaving politicians no choice but to pander. Non-salient issues always
result to policy implementation. Politicians can advertise their effectiveness with little
consequence when they agree with issues with low salience (Thomson, 2001). With clear
popular choice, the game becomes a simple coordination game, politicians gain as much
as they can by implementing a policy for non-salient issues, and avoid getting no payoffs
by pandering for salient issues.
Overall, the results indicate that a divided public, where popular opinion is not clear, may
be better than a united yet ill-informed public. The model can be used to understand
the behavior of politicians when they can be held directly accountable for their actions.
Coalition partnerships, as observed in the UK and Germany, can be studied under this
model. Our results support the empirical results of Eichorst (2014) where coalition part-
ners report low salience issues under less divided policy dimensions, and high salience
issues under more divided policy dimensions.
The model provides an explanation as to why coalition agreements do not only showcase
likely successes, but also diverging political positions as observed empirically (Timmer-
mans, 2006; Moury, 2011; Eichorst, 2014). The results also highlight the importance of
issue salience in political accountability. If media scrutiny on issues considered to be non-
salient is heightened, this can push non-salient issues into the forefront of public awareness,
and reduce the implementation of suboptimal policies. The findings also support Jacobs
and Shapiro (2000) where they show that politicians do not pander as much as conven-
tional wisdom suggests. Even when there is no uncertainty on the popular choice, we
find that pandering is not always a unique equilibrium outcome. Politicians, under the
correct combination of incentives to follow public opinion and disincentives to pander, can
choose to follow what they believe to be socially optimal in equilibrium. Increasing pub-
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lic responsiveness on politician performance can push politicians into taking the socially
optimal choice into account.
The paper aims to contribute to the understanding of pandering in politicians. Although
there is vast literature available on pandering, focusing largely on information communi-
cation, voter targeting, and electoral competition (McGraw et al., 2002; Che et al., 2013;
Morelli and Weelden, 2013; Maskin and Tirole, 2014; Gratton, 2014; Kartik et al., 2015),
the model is, to the best of my knowledge, the first to study pandering under a relative
popularity framework. We also introduce a distinction between the popular choice and
the socially optimal choice. When politicians are provided information on the popular
and socially optimal choices separately, the decision to pander is defined clearly, and the
behaviour of politicians and their propensity to pander can be explored thoroughly.
Under the relative popularity framework, the public does not perceives the actions of an
incumbent independently, but in conjunction with her opponent’s actions. In an envi-
ronment where the public is well-informed, and the popular decision coincides with what
nature reveals to be, ex post, the socially optimal decision, a politician is rewarded when
the action chosen is the popular choice. A good politician is perceived better with an ill-
perceived opponent, whilst a bad politician is worse off if the opponent is well-perceived.
Take for example the recent U.S. elections, Gallup pre-election polls showed that both
Trump and Clinton had the ”worst election-eve images of any major-party presidential
candidates Gallup has measured back to 1956,” with 61% and 52 % perceiving them un-
favorably, respectively (Saad, 2016). It can be argued that if a less disliked candidate ran
against Trump, the results of the election might have been different. The model takes
this adjustment in public perception into account, providing a more realistic framework
to understand politician actions and policy outcomes.
The interaction between politicians and the process of policy-making is also often studied
with the threat of non-reelection, such as Alvarez and Franklin (1994); Grossman and
Helpman (1996); Canes-Wrone et al. (2001). In this paper, the analysis is simplified by
looking at popular opinion on a policy under a binary setting. The uncertainty is retained
in the popular and socially optimal choices. Simplifying preferences to a binary choice
allows for the analysis of issues where individuals with varying policy preferences can be
classed largely into pro and anti sentiments. The comparisons inherent in political com-
petition, specifically in two party systems, are reflected in the model’s relative popularity
model. Removing the assumption that election is the primary driving force for actions
taken in office, different aspects that may influence the policies passed can be explored in
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full.
Pandering is also explored in this paper. We have previously defined a pandering politi-
cian as one who always follows the popular choice regardless of her information on the
socially-optimal state. The definition of pandering in this paper is centered on the re-
sponsiveness of policy on public opinion. The effects of public opinion on policy has been
studied substantially. Jacobs and Shapiro (1997) argued against the presence of pander-
ing in politics, noting that politicians and their staff reported little reliance on polls in
policy formation and more use as a tool for effective communication. We move away from
the assumption of a rational electorate. The electorate’s decision on the popular choice
encompasses more than what is socially-optimal, and may be influenced by factors outside
the issues including race, gender, and emotional judgments (Timpone, 1998; Isbell and
Ottati, 2002). The observed rise of populism in countries within and outside Europe in
recent years contradict this and corroborate the findings of Page and Shapiro (1983) and
Burstein (2003) that policies on salient issues are found to be largely influenced by public
opinion. Outcomes on non-salient issues, on the other hand, are often less congruent with
public opinion Burstein (2003), and provide more room for politicians to pursue personal
interests.
Looking further into the influence of issue salience on politician responsiveness, we can find
examples of how issue salience is played out in the policy making process. When issues are
non-salient, policy implementation is used as a signal of on how effective politicians can be
for more important issues. Constituents may focus on divergent positions, but are often
not interested in specific policy outcomes. Non-salient issues such as voter identification
restrictions in the 2016 US elections are discussed with differing opinions from member of
the public, but policies are rewarded similarly for both options. Other examples include
issues on industry regulation, inheritance taxation, among others. For salient issues, the
public reacts strongly on politician performance. Consider the issue of gun laws in the
United States; Factions of the public cannot fully agree on the controls that need to
be implemented in gun laws. Results from a Pew Research Center 2017 survey showed
that 74% of gun owners and 35% of non-owners considering the right to bear arms as
an essential right (Igielnik and Brown, 2017). Despite examples elsewhere in the UK,
Australia and Canada on the effectiveness of stricter gun control, the implementation of
stricter gun laws could impinge on the perceived freedom of citizens. Consequences given
American attitudes on guns are graver for U.S. politicians. The politicians are aware of
this and find that the easiest way to maximize popularity is to strategically diverge into
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opposing positions, with the Republicans against and the Democrats for gun reform. We
try and capture the shifts observed in politician behaviour by incorporating salience in
the model.
We explore the model and the results thoroughly in the rest of the paper. We begin with
the model setup and the timing of the game in sections 2 and 3, strategies in section 4, a
discussion of the results including best-responses and equilibria for salient and non-salient
issues, and voter welfare analysis in section 5, and concluding remarks in section 6.
2 The Model
Nature selects both a socially optimal choice, ω∗ ∈ Ω∗ = {0, 1}, and a popular choice,
ωp ∈ Ωp = {0, 1}, which are assumed to be independent of each other.
There are two politicians, i ∈ I = 1, 2. The politicians know that the socially optimal
states occurs with the following probabilities: P (ω∗ = 0) = r , and P (ω∗ = 1) = 1 − r,
where 12 ≤ r ≤ 1, and; the popular states occur with the following probabilities: P (ωp =
0) = P (ωp = 1) = 1/2 for the popular choice.
1 Each politician receives a signal θi ∈ {0, 1}
on the popular choice, with an accuracy of qi. The signal indicates what the politicians
believe the popular choice is, and its quality , q, can be characterized as follows.:
P (θi = ωp) = qi
A politician i chooses an action ai ∈ Ai = {0, 1}. Both politicians choose simultaneously,
and a policy is passed once both politicians choose the same action. Politicians know their
own and their opponent’s decision making ability or the quality of signal on the popular
choice.
The public is non-strategic in the model. The public knows only the popular choice. The
public initially assesses the performance of the politicians based on the popular choice, ωp.
The politicians enjoy their popularity in the electorate. The popularity payoffs are given
below:
1By setting r ≥ 1
2








if ai = ωp and a−i 6= ωp,
if ai = ωp and a−i = ωp,
if ai 6= ωp and a−i 6= ωp,
if ai 6= ωp and a−i = ωp.
where 1 ≥ T ≥ B ≥ 0.
A policy is implemented when both politicians choose the same action. Recall that relative
popularity is used in the assessment of politician’s performance. The utility obtained
from choosing the popular choice when the opposing party does not is the highest value
1. The public perceives the politician who follows the popular choice as the effective
agent. In contrast, choosing the unpopular choice when the opposing party chooses the
popular choice provides the politician no utility. The implementation of the popular choice
provides the politicians an increase T in their utilities, less than or equal what they would
have received if the public positively identifies them as the effective agent. Implementing
a policy which is not the public choice provides a utility value of B > 0, as the passing of
the policy is still seen as a positive, albeit a non-representative, governmental response.
Policies that are not in line with the popular choice can yield politicians at most the payoff
for implementing the popular choice, T .
The payoff for implementing policies different from the popular decision can be rewritten
as B = γT , where γ ∈ [0, 1]. The salience of the issue is captured by γ. When issues
are salient to the public, differences in popularity gained from policy implementation are
stark. As the stakes are perceived to be higher, only decisions that align with the popular
opinion obtain public approval (i.e. γ = 0). In constrast, non-salient issues are only thrust
in the spotlight when politicians take divergent decisions. Policies are valued by the public
equally when issues are non-salient, politicians are rewarded for passing policies instead
of the type of policy passed (i.e. γ = 1).
After the actions of the politicians are announced, the socially optimal choice is revealed
to the politicians and the public. The public punishes pandering politicians by decreasing








if ai 6= ωp,
if ai = ωp and ωp = ω
∗,
if ai = ωp and ωp 6= ω∗.
Pandering in this model is defined as the act of following the popular choice to please the
public despite knowing that it is not socially optimal. More specifically, if a politician
is rewarded by choosing the popular action, the revelation of a different socially optimal
choice leads the public to punish the perceived pandering. The popularity of a politicians
decreases by a fraction c when caught pandering. The punishment from pandering is
directly related to how voters react upon learning about politician actions. Krosnick
and Kinder (1990) studied the effect of the news on the secret sale of weapons on Iran in
support of the Nicarguan funds in the approval ratings of Ronald Reagan under the theory
of priming. Under the priming theory defined in their paper, the more attention provided
by media on a specific area, the more the electorate incorporates the acquired information
in the judgment of the president. Krosnick and Kinder (1990) found that outside increasing
public awareness on the government’s intervention in Central America, the information
on the weapon sale affected the evaluation of Reagan’s overall performance more than his
character assessment. Price et al. (1997) also showed in an experiment with university
students that receiving information on an issue relevant to them, (i.e. funding cuts),
significantly affects the topical focus of receivers, and the subsequent thoughts generated
on the issue.
We incorporate this in the interpretation of pandering in the model. Pandering cost is
incurred when a politician reaps rewards from choosing the popular state, and the so-
cially optimal state revealed is different from the popular state. The electorate adjusts
their evaluation of politician performance when a mismatch in the popular choice and
socially-optimal choice is observed. More specifically, pandering costs affect payoffs where
the politicians are compensated for choosing the popular choice, the payoff for the imple-
mentation of the popular policy, T , and the payoff for being identified as the sole effective
agent, 1. The inclusion of the socially optimal decision alters the expected utilities for each
strategy differently. The cost of pandering c ∈ [0, 1] may also be viewed as the expected
cost taking into account the probability of getting caught.
Incorporating pandering δi to the popularity payoffs pii, the utility of the politicians are
provided below:
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if ai = ωp, a−i 6= ωp, and ωp = ω∗,
if ai = ωp, a−i 6= ωp, and ωp 6= ω∗,
if ai = ωp, a−i = ωp, and ωp = ω∗,
if ai = ωp, a−i = ωp, and ωp 6= ω∗,
if ai 6= ωp, a−i 6= ωp, and ωp = ω∗,
if ai 6= ωp, a−i 6= ωp, and ωp 6= ω∗,
if ai 6= ωp, a−i = ωp, and ωp = ω∗,
if ai 6= ωp, a−i = ωp, and ωp 6= ω∗.
The simultaneous-move Bayesian game (N, Ω, Σ, r, Θ, u) is formally defined as follows:
1. There are N = {1, 2} incumbent politicians.
2. The state Ω = (Ω∗,Ωp) where Ω∗ = {0, 1} and Ωp = {0, 1}.
3. The set of strategies σi ∈ Σi for politician i to determine the action ai ∈ Ai = 0, 1.
4. The probability ω∗ = 0, r.
5. The signal on ωp, θi ∈ Θi = 0, 1 with quality q ∈ [1/2, 0].
6. A payoff function for each player i: ui(σ1, σ2; θ1, θ2).
Only politicians play the above Bayesian game. The strategy spaces, the payoff functions,
probability of the socially-optimal states occurring, and the signal quality on popular
choice are assumed to be common knowledge.
The analysis of the model focuses on two main environments: one where the popular
opinion is unclear to politicians (qi = q−i = 0.5), and another where it is (qi = q−i = 1). In
comparing policy results for both salient and non-salient issues between the two extremes,
the effects of pandering can be studied in more detail.
61
3 Timing of the Game
1. Nature chooses the socially-optimal choice ω∗ ∈ {0, 1}. The socially optimal choice
is the choice that most benefits the public. Politicians do not have prior policy
preferences, and are aware of how likely each action is to be the socially optimal
choice.
2. Politicians each receive a signal on the socially-optimal choice.
3. The public decides on a popular choice ωp ∈ {0, 1}. Both states are equally likely.
4. Politicians each receive a signal on the popular choice.
5. Politician i chooses an action ai ∈ {0, 1}. A policy gets passed if ai = a−i, otherwise
status quo is preserved.
6. The popular choice is revealed. The public rewards politicians with popularity if the
popular action is chosen or a policy is implemented.
7. The socially optimal choice is revealed. The public punishes the politician if pan-
dering is observed. A politician is perceived to pander when the popular choice is
chosen over the socially optimal one.
4 Strategies
The politicians can choose one of six strategies, σi ∈ Σi = {P,L,R,C,G,D}:
 Pander (P) : Politician i employs the strategy Pander if he follows his signal,
ai = θi, ∀ θi
 Left (L): Politician i employs the strategy Left if he always chooses ai = 0, ∀ θi
 Right (R): Politician i employs the strategy Right if he always chooses ai = 1, ∀ θi
 Contrarian (C): Politician i is Contrarian if he always chooses the opposite of




i is different from the signal θi
 Good (G): Politician i is Good if he always chooses the action that he believes
maximizes public welfare. More specifically, if P (ω∗) > 12 , the politician chooses
ai = ω
∗, regardless of his signal.
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 Destructive (D): Politician i is Destructive if he always chooses the action oppostie
of the one he believes maximizes public welfare, i.e., if P (ω∗) > 12 , the politician
chooses ai 6= ω∗, regardless of his signal.
The six strategies above are exhaustive. We discuss each strategy in more detail below.
A politician who always chooses the strategy pander (P) always chooses the action that he
believes is the popular choice. A pandering politician disregards his signal on the socially
optimal choice. As the electorate reward politicians exclusively on how their actions align
with the popular choice, pandering can provide a politician with significant popularity
payoffs. The strategy is expected to pay off when the information the politician has on
the popular choice is good. When the signal of the politician on the popular choice is
very good, the probability the action is rewarded is higher. Note however, that when the
socially-optimal choice is revealed and the electorate finds that the politician is rewarded
for choosing a popular action that is not the socially-optimal choice, the politician is
punished.
Politicians always choose a preferred action for strategies left (L) and (R). As the states
of the popular choice are equally likely, politicians have a fifty percent chance of choosing
the popular choice. Politicians who always choose strategies left and right do not take into
account the signals they receive on the popular choice and the socially-optimal choice. The
strategy pays off the most when the information the politician has on the popular choice
is minimal. We can draw a parallel with real world politics through politicians with very
strong ideological beliefs – with little regard to the preferences of their counsituencies.
A contrarian (C) politician always chooses the decision opposite to the signal received on
the popular choice. As with the pandering politician, the contrarian always disregards his
signal on the socially optimal choice. The strategy is very risky. As with Go (2016), the
contrarian strategy C is always strictly dominated by strategy P . The accuracy of the
action taken, with respect to the popular choice, under strategy C is always less than 1/2.
With the signal accuracy at qi ≥ 1/2, payoffs under strategy P are always larger than
those under strategy C.
Under the strategy good (G) , the politician always chooses the action that he believes is
the socially-optimal choice. The politician minimizes the cost of pandering by following the
signal on the socially optimal choice. However, by disregarding the signal on the popular
choice, the politician only has a fifty percent probability of securing the popularity-realted
payoffs. When the costs on pandering are very high, becoming a good politician may pay
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off.
Lastly, for the strategy destructive (D), a politician always chooses the action opposite
to his signal on the socially-optimal choice. Although the politician faces a higher risk of
being penalised if the socially-optimal choice is not in line with the popular choice, the
strategy destructive provides the politician a fifty percent chance of securing a popularity
related payoff. Furthermore, if the opposing politician has a propensity to be good, the
politician can look like the effective agent prior to the revelation of the socially-optimal
choice by employing the destructive strategy.
5 Results
5.1 Expected Utilities




[P (ωp = ω)(T P (ai = ω)P (a−i = ω) + P (ai = ω)P (a−i 6= ω) +B P (ai 6= ω)P (a−i 6= ω)]





[P (ωp = ω)((P (ai = ω)(T P (a−i = ω) + P (a−i 6= ω)) +B P (ai 6= ω)P (a−i 6= ω))]−∑
ω∈Ω
[cP (ω∗ 6= ω)P (ωp = ω)(T P (ai = ω)P (a−i = ω) + P (ai = ω)P (a−i 6= ω))]
The analysis of the results is broken down into two main cases, one where politicians have
no information on the popular choice, another where full information is available. For each
case, politician actions and policy implications for both salient and non-salient issues are
studied in detail. The following definitions are used in the computation of best response
and Bayesian Nash equilibria. The computations are shown in full in the appendices.
Definition. Best Response
BRi(σ−i) = σi ∈ Σ : EU1(σi, σ−i) ≥ EU1(σ′i, σ−i) for all σ′i ∈ Σ
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Definition. Nash Equilibrium
σ∗ = (σ∗1, σ∗2) is a Nash Equilibrium if σ∗i ∈ BRi(σ∗−i) for every i ∈ N
5.2 Case 1: Popular Choice is Unclear (qi = q−i = 12)
The popular choice is unclear when both politicians have bad signals, qi = q−i = 1/2. At
q = 1/2, the politician’s signal on popular choice does not provide him with additional
information.
Proposition 1
When the popular choice is unclear (qi = q−i = 12) and the issue is non-salient (γ = 1),
1. If T ≥ 12−c , there exist only four possible equilibria (L,L), (R,R), (G,G), or (D,D),
2. If 12 − 12c ≤ T < 12−c , there exists a unique equilibrium (G,G),
3. If 2+c−4cr4−c ≤ T < 12 − 12c and r > 7−c8 , there exists only two possible equilibria
(G,D) or (D,G),
4. If T < 12 − 12c, T < 2+c−4cr4−c , and r ≤ 7−c8 , there exist only four possible equilibria
(R,L), (L,R), (G,D), and (D,G).
We illustrate Proposition 1 in Figure 1.
When the issue is non-salient, γ = 1, the popularity expected from passing a policy does
not vary across decisions (B=T). The politicians have no clear indication on what the
electorate prefers given very poor signal quality on the popular choice. Pandering does
not provide politicians any additional benefits. Although the electorate has a preferred
decision, only divergence in positions can provide politicians with differing popularity pay-
offs. Consider, for instance, the bill on the additional requirements in voter identification.
The issue is only highlighted when there are dissenting opinions from politicians, and is
pushed into media scrutiny; Otherwise, politicians are perceived to be performing their
duties in office.
If the rewards for implementing policy, T and B , are high enough, politicians gravitate
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Figure 1: Non-Salient Issue with Relative Certainty on Socially Optimal Choice given
q = 12
towards a single decision, without regard to the popular and socially optimal decisions, to
maximize their popularity payoffs. High pandering costs pushes politicians towards pur-
suing the socially optimal decision. As there is no clear indication on the popular choice,
pandering is very risky for politicians, and the costs on being perceived as a pandering
politician deters them from straying from what the likely socially optimal decision is. The
pursuance of socially optimal policies are then observed at moderate policy popularity
payoffs, and at higher policy payoffs for very high pandering costs. For very low rewards
for policy implementation, there are no incentives for politicians to choose similar posi-
tions. As one politician tries to minimize pandering costs by choosing the socially optimal
decision (G), the other chooses the antithetical position (D) to maximize the chances of
being identified as the sole effective agent.
Proposition 2
When the popular choice is unclear (qi = q−i = 12) and the issue is salient (γ = 0),
1. If T ≥ 1− c, there exists a unique equilibrium (G,G),
2. If 2+c−4cr2−c ≤ T < 1− c and r > 4−c4 , there exists only two possible equilibria
(G,D) or (D,G),
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3. If T < 1− c, T < 2+c−4cr2−c and r ≤ 4−c4 , there exists only four possible equilibria
(R,L), (L,R), (G,D) or (D,G).
Figure 2: Salient Issue with Relative Certainty on Socially Optimal Choice given q = 12
When issues are salient, γ = 0, implementing the decision that is not popular is the same
as choosing the wrong decision. With Proposition 2, if the payoffs for the implementation
of the socially-optimal policy are high implementation is high enough, politicians gravitate
towards the socially optimal decision. The results echo those from a study conducted by
Mooney and Lee (2000) on U.S. Death Penalty Reform from 1965 to 1982 focusing on the
impact of consensus versus contentious policies. Mooney and Lee (2000) found that for
morality issues, which are highly salient, politicians try their best to reflect public opinion
under the right incentives, even though there may be a dearth of information and public
opinion. It may be possible that expert opinion, or the likely socially-optimal choice, is
used to stand in for popular opinion. Literature on public opinion also find that salient
issues show higher degrees of responsiveness from politicians (Page and Shapiro, 1983;
Edwards et al., 1995; Burstein, 2003). This may be due to the impact salient issues have
on re-election prospects. Note that as there are no incentives in pursuing decisions that are
not the popular decision, B = 0, no other pair of equilibria strategies are pooling, outside
both politicians choosing to be good and following the more likely socially-optimal choice.
Pandering is difficult since the signal on public choice is hazy. At low payoffs for popular
policy implementation, politicians maximize by pursuing dissenting positions. Note that
as the certainty on the socially-optimal choice, r, increases, the difference between the
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payoffs in G and L decrease. Proposition 2 is summarized in Figure 2.
5.3 Case 2: Popular Choice is Clear (qi = q−i = 1)
The popular choice is clear when the signal received is always correct, qi = q−i = 1.
Politicians know exactly what the public wants, making pandering a very attractive option.
The analysis shows that pandering may not always be the most preferred option despite
the accuracy of the signal on public opinion. The policy outcomes differ depending on the
salience of the issue discussed.
Proposition 3
When the popular choice is clear (qi = q−i = 1) and the issue is non-salient (γ = 1),
1. If T ≥ 1− c, there exists only two possible equilibria (P,P) or (G,G),
2. If T ≥ 1− cr and T ≥ 12−c , there exists only two possible equilibria (P,P) or (L,L) ,
and
3. If T ≥ 1 − c(1 − r) and T ≥ 12−c , there exists only two possible equilibria (P,P) or
(R,R).
When the popular choice is clear and the issue is non-salient, politicians pander in equi-
librium. Recall that the payoffs for policy implementation are the same regardless if it
coincides with the popular choice (T = B). Coordinating to follow the popular choice al-
lows both politicians to secure the payoffs from implementing a policy. However, it is not
the only possible equilibria outcome. When the cost of pandering is sufficiently high, the
implementation of the socially optimal policy is an equilibrium. Similar to the observa-
tions from Mooney and Lee (2000), with the correct incentives, politicians can be pushed
to follow the public opinion. However, as the issue is non-salient, this is no longer a unique
outcome. All equilibrium strategy pairs are pooling and result to policy implementation.
When there is no uncertainty on the popular choice for a non-salient issue, politicians im-
plement any policy. Doing so may signal effectiveness as an agent, politicians who deliver
on simple promises, advertise the outcomes in the hopes of increasing rewards from the
electorate (Thomson, 2001). In an empirical study on coalitional agreeements, Eichorst
(2014) noted that published agreements of coalition partners included low salience issues
under policies on which they are less divided. Politicians may also use the non-salient
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nature of the issue to pursue what they think is best for the public (see points 3 and 4 in
Proposition 3).
Figure 3: Non-Salient Issue with Relative Certainty on Socially Optimal Choice given
q = 1
Proposition 4
When the popular choice is clear and the issue is salient (γ = 0), both politicians pander
in equilibrium (P,P).
There are no benefits in choosing any action that does not match the public opinion for non-
salient issues. Politicians only obtain popularity payoffs when the action chosen aligns with
the popular choice. As politicians are certain on what the public opinion is, the certainty
of the payoffs offset any pandering cost. Furthermore, if an opponent panders, choosing
not to pander increases the chances of being perceived as the less effective agent. The
pandering equilibrium is in contrast to the findings of Mooney and Lee (2000) where the
political elite is one-sided the political elite has a very significant influence on the policy
change. However, it is important to note that as the model only considers popularity
payoffs, by ignoring the information on the popular choice, the politicians forgoes any
possible utility, leaving pandering as the only possible profitable option. The likelihood of
having issues where public opinion is consolidated is low.
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The shift in the set of equilibria observed between the two cases provides very valuable
insights on how politicians behave when they can get caught pandering. The lack of
influence of polls on policy formation as noted by Jacobs and Shapiro (1997) may be due
to the issues discussed and the accuracy of politician information on public opinion. We
continue with discussing the impact of each dimension on the policy outcomes in more
detail.
5.4 Impact of Public Opinion on Policy Outcomes
The quality of information politicians receive on the popular choice affects the policy
implemented. The effects vary for salient and non -salient issues. The results support
finding from existing literature where politicians are observed to be more responsive when
issues are salient (Page and Shapiro, 1983; Weaver, 1991; Edwards et al., 1995; Burstein,
2003).
For salient issues, when the popular choice is unclear, the socially optimal policy is im-
plemented when the policy payoff T is sufficiently high. At lower levels of T , no policy
is implemented. Politicians prefer to diverge and attempt to be perceived as the more
effective agent. When the policy choice is clear and the issue is salient, politicians un-
equivocally pander to the public. For important issues, the results indicate that a divided
public, where popular opinion is not clear, may be better than a united yet ill-informed
public.
For non-salient issues, politicians implement policies across a wider combination of policy
implementation payoffs and pandering costs when the quality of information on popular
choice improves. When the popular choice is clear, a policy is always implemented. The
popular opinion is always followed when the policy implementation payoffs are sufficiently
low. Otherwise, politicians can choose to implement policies that may not necessary align
with the popular opinion. In contrast, policies are only implemented under sufficiently
high payoffs when the quality of information is poor. Politicians with poor private in-
formation always follow the decision that they believe provide socially optimal outcomes
under moderate policy implementation payoffs and sufficiently high pandering cost deter-
rents. The area in which politicians can select from different pooling equilibria observed
is reduced substantially when the quality of private information drops.
The paper finds that politicians place more consideration on what is socially optimal when
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the demands of the public are not clear. Politicians, when issues are highly salient, may
follow
ptimal decision. The results echo those from a study conducted by Mooney and Lee (2000)
on U.S. Death Penalty Reform from 1965 to 1982 focusing on the impact of consensus ver-
sus contentious policies. Mooney and Lee (2000) found that for morality issues, which are
highly salient, politicians try their best to reflect public opinion under the right incentives,
even though there may be a dearth of information and public opinion. It may be possible
that expert opinion, or the likely socially-optimal choice, is used to stand in for popular
opinion. Literature on public opinion also find that salient issues show higher degrees of
responsiveness from politicians (Page and Shapiro, 1983; Edwards et al., 1995; Burstein,
2003).
5.5 Impact of Salience on Policy Outcomes
Burstein (2003) in his review of the impact of public opinion in public policy noted that
the salience of the issue does affect public policy. The equilibrium results for both salient
and non-salient issues corroborate this result. The analysis shows that when issues are
salient, only one equilibrium result provides a concrete policy outcome. Non-salient issues,
on the other hand, provide more equilibria that result to policy.
When popular choice is unclear, salient issues result to either a divergence in politician
actions, or the implementation of the socially optimal policy. The public receives a socially
optimal policy or remain in the status quo. Policy outcomes under non-salient issues are
not as straightforward. Politicians have more discretion on what policies to implement,
with the exception of moderate policy implementation payoffs where only the socially-
optimal policy is implemented. When private information is low, politicians are more
careful on deciding on which policies to pass. When payoffs from implementing policy are
low, politicians prefer to diverge in position to appear as the effective agent.
When popular choice is clear, salient issues push politicians to exclusively pander - only the
popular policy can be implemented. Non-salient issues provide politicians with more room
to choose between the popular, socially optimal, and ideology-based policies. Politicians
can always choose to implement the popular policy; the policy options increase as the
implementation payoff increases.
Although issue salience ensures the implementation of socially optimal policy where pop-
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ular choice is unclear, the opposite is observed when politicians have excellent private
information on the popular choice. Politicians pander exclusively in this environment.
Salience is not the best indicator of when politicians put their constituents best interest
in mind.
5.6 Analysis of Voter Welfare
The public benefits most when the socially-optimal choice is implemented. In this paper,
voter welfare is measured by the probability that the socially-optimal choice is imple-
mented under each possible pair of actions in equilibrium. We summarize these probabil-
ities in the table below.
Voter Welfare
Equilibrium Actions % of Socially-Optimal Policy Imple-
mentation
PP 0.5 + q2 − q
LL r
RR 1− r
GG 0.5 + r2 − r
RL 0
GD 0
As voter welfare is measured according to the number of times the socially-optimal policy is
implemented, we find that only coordinated actions from the politicians increase electorate
welfare. When both politicians always choose one action regardless of the signals on both
the socially-optimal and popular choices, the probability that the socially optimal policy
is implemented is given simply by the probability of the action being the socially-optimal
choice. Improving the information of politicians on both popular and socially-optimal
choices makes it more likely for the socially-optimal policy to be implemented. This
may seem counterintuitive for the equilibrium outcome where both politicians pander.
However, it is important to note that as the quality of the signal increases, the more likely
it is for politicians to coordinate and implement a policy.
When information on the socially-optimal choice is high, the electorate is better off when
politicians are good. Although pandering is not ideal, the electorate benefits when the
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quality of the signal on the popular choice is clear. When neither signal is good, the voter
welfare is highest if the politicians happen to choose the state that coincides with the
socially-optimal choice.
5.7 Comparative Statics
The strength of the indicator for the socially optimal choice is observed to have a significant
impact to the payoffs. The impact of r varies according strategy pairs. In general, any
strategy pair that contains any two of the three strategies Pander, Good and Destructive.
When the popular choice is unclear, only Pander provides constant expected utility with
respect to r, regardless of opponent strategy. At very high levels of r, the likelihood of
paying pandering costs approaches 0 for ai = 0 (strategy Left), and 1 for ai = 1 (strategy
Right). For polarized strategies L and R, payoffs under σi = L in general increases
with r, and the opposite is observed with σi = R. Effects on expected utilities for Good
and Destructive strategies vary depending on the policy implementation benefit T , the
pandering cost c, and the salience of the issue γ. The changes are summarized in the table
below:
Changes in Expected Utility given ↑ r
EU1(σi, σ−i) q = 0.5 q = 1
EU1(P, P ) no effect no effect
EU1(L,P ) ↑ ↑
EU1(R,P ) ↓ ↓
EU1(G,P ) no effect no effect
EU1(D,P ) no effect no effect
EU1(P,L) no effect ↓
EU1(L,L) ↑ ↑
EU1(R,L) ↓ ↓
EU1(G,L) ↑, if T > 11+γ ↑, if T > 11+γ
EU1(D,L) ↑, if T < 1−c1−c+γ ↑, T < 1−c1−c+γ
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Changes in Expected Utility given ↑ r
EU1(σi, σ−i) q = 0.5 q = 1
EU1(P,R) no effect ↑
EU1(L,R) ↑ ↑
EU1(R,R) ↓ ↓
EU1(G,R) ↑, if T < 11+γ ↑, if T < 11+γ
EU1(D,R) ↑, if T > 1−c1−c+γ ↑, T > 1−c1−c+γ
EU1(P,R) no effect ↑
EU1(L,R) ↑ ↑
EU1(R,R) ↓ ↓
EU1(G,R) ↑, if T < 11+γ ↑, if T < 11+γ
EU1(D,R) ↑, if T > 1−c1−c+γ ↑, T > 1−c1−c+γ
EU1(P,G) no effect no effect
EU1(L,G) ↑, if T > 1−c1+γ ↑, if T > 1−c1+γ
EU1(R,G) ↑, if T < 1−c1+γ ↑, if T < 1−c1+γ
EU1(G,G) no effect no effect
EU1(D,G) no effect no effect
EU1(P,D) no effect no effect
EU1(L,D) ↑, if T < 11−c+γ ↑, if T < 11−c+γ
EU1(R,D) ↑, if T > 11−c+γ ↑, if T > 11−c+γ
EU1(G,D) no effect no effect
EU1(D,D) no effect no effect
6 Conclusion
In this paper, two politicians decide on policy actions given the action of their oppononet
and their beliefs on both popular and socially optimal choices. The model introduces the
idea of relative popularity, wherein the actions of a politician may be perceived better or
worse depending on the action of their opponent. Both politicians are uncertain on the
popular and socially optimal choices, but receive a signal for both. The public however
knows the popular choice, but has no information on the socially optimal choice. Politi-
cians are rewarded when the popular choice is followed. A politician panders by following
the popular choice regardless of her information on the socially-optimal state. The public
perceives a politician to be pandering when the socially optimal choice is revealed to be
different different from the popular choice, and the politician has obtained payoff from the
popular choice.
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We find that the actions of politicians and the subsequent policy outcomes depend on the
quality of the signal on the popular choice and the salience of the issue. When the popular
choice is unclear, pandering as a strategy disappears. Uncertainty in public perception
leads politicians to take divergent positions to maximize the chance of being identified
as the most effective agent. For issues that are non-salient, very high popularity rewards
on policy implementation provide politicians incentives to misbehave and implement any
policy regardless of public opinion and welfare. For salient issues, however, we find that
the only possible outcomes are a divergence of positions for the politicians and the im-
plementation of the socially optimal policy, with the second outcome increasing as the
pandering costs increase. Interestingly, the likelihood of each option being the socially
optimal choice does not affect the policies implemented in both critical and non-critical
issues. The only impact is the type of divergence in positions taken if no agreeement is
reached. However, when popular choice is clear, politicians exclusively pander when the
issue is salient. For non-salient issues, politicians always implement a policy. The policies
vary as the implementation payoffs increase. Salience is not a reliable indicator of when
politicians put their constituents best interests in mind. However, politicians place more
consideration on what is socially optimal when the demands of the public are not clear.
The results indicate that for issues of very high importance the public may sometimes be
better off when there is more uncertainty on popular opinion.
The model can be used to understand the behavior of politicians when they can be held
directly accountable for their actions. Coalition partnerships can be explored further under
this model. The model provides important insights on how and when politicians pander.
The results also highlight the importance of issue salience in political accountability.Voters
may be able to induce politicians to vote for the socially optimal choice regardless of
popular choice if key conditions given the type of issue are met. The paper will be
further developed through the introduction of information asymmetry, and multiple issue
platforms across one or two periods.
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A General Expected Utilities




[P (ωp = ω)(T P (ai = ω)P (a−i = ω) + P (ai = ω)P (a−i 6= ω)+
B P (ai 6= ω)P (a−i 6= ω)]
Pandering cost is incurred when the popular state is not equal to the socially optimal
state. As stated previously, only the payoffs T and 1 can be affected by pandering costs.




[P (ωp = ω)[(T P (ai = ω)P (a−i = ω) + P (ai = ω)P (a−i 6= ω) +B P (ai 6= ω)P (a−i 6= ω)]]−∑
[cP (ω∗ 6= ω)P (ωp = ω)(T P (ai = ω)P (a−i = ω) + P (ai = ω)P (a−i 6= ω))]
The expected utilities for each possible strategy are outlined below, beginning with Pander.
The following probabilities are used in determining P (ω∗ 6= ai) for the strategy Pander :
P (ω∗ 6= ωp|θi = 0) = qi + r − 2qir
P (ω∗ 6= ωp|θi = 1) = 1− qi − r + 2qir
The Expected Utility for strategy Pander, P , is given as follows:
EUi(P, σ−i) =
∑
[P (ωp = ω)(TqiP (a−i = ω) + qiP (a−i 6= ω) +B(1− qi)P (a−i 6= ω)]−
c
∑
(P (ω∗ 6= ωp|θi = ω)P (ωp = ω)(TqiP (a−i = ω) + qiP (a−i 6= ω)))
For strategy Left (L) , the pandering cost is incurred only if the socially optimal decision
is not their decision of choice (i.e. ω∗ 6= 0). Under strategy L, if θi = 0 ,P (ai = ωp) = q,
and 1− q if θi = 1.
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The Expected Utility for strategy Left, L , is given as follows:
EUi(L, σ−i) =
∑
[P (ωp = ω)(T P (ai = ω)P (a−i = ω) + P (ai = ω)P (a−i 6= ω) +B P (ai 6= ω)P (a−i 6= ω)]−
c(P (ω∗ 6= 0)
∑
P (ωp = ω)(T P (ai = ω)P (a−i = ω) + P (ai = ω)P (a−i 6= ω)))
Under Right, the pandering cost is incurred only if the socially optimal decision is not
their decision of choice (i.e. ω∗ 6= 1), the expected utility is given below.
EUi(R, σ−i) =
∑
[P (ωp = ω)(T P (ai = ω)P (a−i = ω) + P (ai = ω)P (a−i 6= ω) +B P (ai 6= ω)P (a−i 6= ω)]−
cP (ω∗ 6= 1)
∑
(P (ωp = ω)(T P (ai = ω)P (a−i = ω) + P (ai = ω)P (a−i 6= ω)))
The remaining strategies Good(G) and Destructive(D) require the politicians to tailor fit
their actions according to what they believe the socially optimal state. For strategy G, if
ω∗ = ω, P (ai = ω) = 1, and 0 otherwise. Strategy D results to P (ai = ω) = 1 if ω∗ 6= ω,
and 0 otherwise.
The Expected Utilities for strategies G and D, are given as follows:
EUi(G, σ−i) =
∑
[P (ωp = ω)(P (ω
∗ = ω)(T P (ai = ω)P (a−i = ω) + P (ai = ω)P (a−i 6= ω)+
B P (ai 6= ω)P (a−i 6= ω)) + P (ω∗ 6= ω)(T P (ai = ω)P (a−i = ω)+
P (ai = ω)P (a−i 6= ω) +B P (ai 6= ω)P (a−i 6= ω))]
EUi(D,σ−i) =
∑
[P (ωp = ω)(P (ω
∗ = ω)(T P (ai = ω)P (a−i = ω) + P (ai = ω)P (a−i 6= ω)+
B P (ai 6= ω)P (a−i 6= ω) + P (ω∗ 6= ω)((1− c)(T P (ai = ω)P (a−i = ω)+
P (ai = ω)P (a−i 6= ω)) +B P (ai 6= ω)P (a−i 6= ω))]
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Recall that from Go (2016), Honest dominates Contrarian. The probability of obtaining
each popularity payoff is always higher with Honest. The strategy Pander is the same
as Honest in Go (2016) where the popular choice is followed, only with a pandering cost
removes a proportion c from the expected utility, the same holds for Contrarian. As dom-
inated strategies are removed in the process of obtaining equilibria, we proceed with the
computation of expected utilities with the five remaining strategies, Σ′i = {P, L, R, G, D}.
Expected utilities of politician 1 for each strategy profile are computed as outlined above 2:
EU1(P, P ) = q
2(c(0.5 − 0.5T ) + T − 1 + γT ) + q(1− 0.5c− 2γT ) + γT
EU1(L,P ) = 0.5(1− c(1− r))(q(T − 1) + 1)− 0.5γ(q − 1)T
EU1(R,P ) = 0.5(1− cr)(q(T − 1) + 1)− 0.5γ(q − 1)T
EU1(G,P ) = 0.5q(T − 1− γT ) + 0.5γT + 0.5
EU1(D,P ) = 0.5c(q(1− T )− 1) + 0.5q(T − 1− γT ) + 0.5γT + 0.5
EU1(P,L) = 0.5cq(T − 1)(q(2r − 1))− 0.5cqTr + 0.5cq(1− r) + 0.5qT + 0.5(γT (1− q) + q)
EU1(L,L) = 0.5T (γ + 1− c(1− r))
EU1(R,L) = 0.5− 0.5cr
EU1(G,L) = 0.5 + 0.5r((γ + 1)T − 1)
EU1(D,L) = 0.5(γT − r(c+ γT − 1)) + 0.5(1− c)(1− r)T
EU1(P,R) = 0.5cq(1− T )(2qr − q − r) + 0.5qT (1− c) + 0.5(q + γT (1− q))
EU1(L,R) = 0.5c(r − 1) + 0.5
EU1(R,R) = 0.5T (1− cr + γ)
EU1(G,R) = 0.5(r + γT (1− r)) + 0.5(1− r)T
EU1(D,R) = 0.5((1− c)(1− r) + γrT ) + 0.5(1− c)rT
EU1(P,G) = 0.5q(T + 1− c− γT ) + 0.5γT
2As the game is symmetric, the same values are observed for politician 2 (e.g. EU1(L,P ) = EU2(P,L)).
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EU1(L,G) = 0.5r(γT + T − 1)− 0.5c(1− r) + 0.5
EU1(R,G) = 0.5γ(1− r)T + 0.5(r + T (1− r))− 0.5cr
EU1(G,G) = 0.5(γ + 1)T
EU1(D,G) = 0.5− 0.5c
EU1(P,D) = 0.5q(T (1− c− γ) + 1) + 0.5γT
EU1(L,D) = 0.5γ(1− r)T + 0.5(r + T (1− r))− 0.5c(1− r)T
EU1(R,D) = 0.5r(T (γ + 1− c)− 1) + 0.5
EU1(G,D) = 0.5
EU1(D,D) = 0.5T (1− c+ γ)
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B Best Responses and Equilibria:
qi = q−i = 0.5, γ = 1
The computation of the best responses of politicians when the popular opinion is unclear
on a non-salient issue are shown in full below.
Substituting qi = q−i = 0.5, γ = 1 to the expected utilities above, the best responses for
all possible opponent strategies: Σi = {P, L, R, G, D} are shown in full for politician 1.
σi is a best response to σ−i ∈ Σ, if EUi(σi, σ−i) ≥ EUi(σ′i, σ−i), ∀σ′i ∈ Σ.
When σ−i = P
EU1(P, P ) = −0.125c(T + 1) + 0.5T + 0.25
EU1(L,P ) = 0.25c(r − 1)(T + 1) + 0.5T + 0.25
EU1(R,P ) = −0.25cr(T + 1) + 0.5T + 0.25
EU1(G,P ) = 0.5T + 0.25
EU1(D,P ) = −0.25c(T + 1) + 0.5T + 0.25
Looking at T values where EU1(P, P ) ≥ EU1(σi, P ), where σi 6= P .
EU1(P, P ) ≥ EU1(L,P )
−0.125c(T + 1) + 0.5T + 0.25 ≥ 0.25c(r − 1)(T + 1) + 0.5T + 0.25
−0.125c(T + 1) ≥ 0.25c(r − 1)(T + 1)
−0.125cT − 0.125c ≥ 0.25crT − 0.25cT + 0.25cr − 0.25c
−0.25crT + 0.125cT ≥ 0.25cr − 0.125c
Tc(1− 2r) ≥ c(2r − 1)
T ≤ −1
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EU1(P, P ) ≥ EU1(R,P )
−0.125c(T + 1) + 0.5T + 0.25 ≥ −0.25cr(T + 1) + 0.5T + 0.25
−0.125c(T + 1) ≥ −0.25cr(T + 1)
−0.125cT − 0.125c ≥ −0.25crT − 0.25cr
0.25crT − 0.125cT ≥ −0.25cr + 0.125c
Tc(2r − 1) ≥ −c(2r − 1)
T > −1
EU1(P, P ) ≥ EU1(G,P )
−0.125c(T + 1) + 0.5T + 0.25 ≥ 0.5T + 0.25
−0.125c(T + 1) ≥ 0
T + 1 ≤ 0
T ≤ −1
EU1(P, P ) ≥ EU1(D,P )
−0.125c(T + 1) + 0.5T + 0.25 ≥ −0.25c(T + 1) + 0.5T + 0.25
−0.125c(T + 1) ≥ −0.25c(T + 1)
0.125cT ≥ −0.125c
T > −1
For all possible values of T ∈ [0, 1], expected utilities under Pander, σi = P are always
greater than those under strategies Right (R) and Destructive (D). As T can never negative
(i.e. in the absence of a socially optimal choice, politicians are not punished for imple-
menting a policy), strategies Left (L) and Good (G) are more attractive than Pander. We
obtain the best response for σ−i = P by comparing expected utilities for strategies L and
G.
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EU1(G,P ) ≥ EU1(L,P )
0.5T + 0.25 ≥ 0.25c(r − 1)(T + 1) + 0.5T + 0.25
0 ≥ 0.25c(r − T + rT − 1)
T (1− r) ≥ r − 1
T ≥ −1
As T ∈ [0, 1] , the strategy Good will always be chosen by the politician when the opponent
chooses Pander.
BRi(P ) = G
When σ−i = L
EU1(P,L) = −0.125c(T + 1) + 0.5T + 0.25
EU1(L,L) = 0.5T (2− c(1− r))
EU1(R,L) = 0.5− 0.5cr
EU1(G,L) = 0.5 + 0.5r(2T − 1)
EU1(D,L) = 0.5(T − r(c+ T − 1)) + 0.5(1− c)(1− r)T
Finding the conditions for EU1(L,L) ≥ EU1(σi, L), where σi 6= L,
EU1(L,L) ≥ EU1(P,L)
0.5T (2− c(1− r)) ≥ −0.125c(T + 1) + 0.5T + 0.25
0.5T − 0.375cT + 0.5cTr ≥ −0.125c+ 0.25
4T − 3cT + 4cTr ≥ −c+ 2




0.5T (2− c(1− r)) ≥ 0.5− 0.5cr
T (2− c(1− r)) ≥ 1− cr
T ≥ 1− cr
2− c+ cr
EU1(L,L) ≥ EU1(G,L)
0.5T (2− c(1− r)) ≥ 0.5 + 0.5r(2T − 1)
T (2− c(1− r)) ≥ 1− r + 2rT
T ≥ 1− r
2− c+ cr − 2r





0.5T (2− c(1− r)) ≥ 0.5(T − r(c+ T − 1)) + 0.5(1− c)(1− r)T
T (2− c(1− r)) ≥ (T − r(c+ T − 1)) + (1− c)(1− r)T
T (2− c(1− r))− T (1− r)− (1− c)(1− r)T ≥ r(1− c)
T (2− c(1− r)− (1− r)− (1− c)(1− r)) ≥ r(1− c)
T (2− (1 + c)(1− r)− (1− c)(1− r)) ≥ r(1− c)
2rT ≥ r(1− c)
T ≥ 1− c
2
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4− 3c+ 4cr ≥ (2− c)2
4− 3c+ 4cr ≥ 4− 4c+ c2
1 + 4r ≥ c
For all possible combinations of r and c, condition (LN.1) is more stringent than condition
(LN.2). When the expected utility of politicians under strategy Left exceeds that under
Good, it follows that the expected utility under Pander is also exceeded.
We proceed in a similar manner with the remaining conditions for EU1(L,L) ≥ EU1(R,L) :
1−cr






2− c+ cr ≥ (1− cr)(2− c)
2− c+ cr ≥ 2− 2cr − c+ c2r







2 ≥ (1− c)(2− c)
2 ≥ 2− 3c+ c2
3 ≥ c
3As c ∈ [0, 1] and r ∈ [ 1
2
, 1], both denominators are positive.
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The condition for (LN.1) is more stringent than both (LN.3) and (LN.4). For all
T ≥ 12−c , L is the best response for σ−i = L.
From the expected utilities for the remaining strategies, we find the range of values under
which EU1(G,L) is the best response.
EU1(G,L) ≥ EU1(P,L)
0.5 + 0.5r(2T − 1) ≥ −0.125c(T + 1) + 0.5T + 0.25
4 + 8rT − 4r ≥ −cT − c+ 4T + 2
8rT + cT − 4T ≥ 4r − c− 2
T ≥ 4r − 2− c
8r − 4 + c
EU1(G,L) ≥ EU1(R,L)
0.5 + 0.5r(2T − 1) ≥ 0.5− 0.5cr
1 + 2rT − r ≥ 1− cr
T ≥ 1− c
2
EU1(G,L) ≥ EU1(D,L)
0.5 + 0.5r(2T − 1) ≥ 0.5(T − r(c+ T − 1)) + 0.5(1− c)(1− r)T
1 + 2rT − r ≥ T − cr − rT + r + (1− c)(1− r)T
3rT − T − (1− c)(1− r)T ≥ 2r − cr − 1
T ≥ 2r − cr − 1
4r − 2 + c− cr
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Comparing the conditions for EU1(G,L) ≥ EU1(P,L) : 4r−2−c8r−4+c (LN.5) , EU1(G,L) ≥
EU1(R,L) :
1−c
2 (LN.6), and EU1(G,L) ≥ EU1(D,L) : 2r−cr−14r−2+c−cr (LN.7),
(LN.5) ≥ (LN.6)
4r − 2− c
8r − 4 + c ≥
1− c
2
−2c ≥ 5c− 8rc− c2
8r ≥ 7− c





≥ 2r − cr − 1
4r − 2 + c− cr
3r − 3 + c− cr ≥ 0
r ≤ 1
When r is sufficiently high, (LN.5) is more stringent that (LN.6); while for all possible
values c and r, satisfying condition(LN.6) also satisfies (LN.7). To complete the best
response for σ−i = L, the expected utilities under strategies Pander, Right, and Destructive
are also compared.
EU1(P,L) ≥ EU1(R,L)
−0.125c(T + 1) + 0.5T + 0.25 ≥ 0.5− 0.5cr
−cT − c+ 4T ≥ 2− 4cr
T ≥ 2 + c− 4cr
4− c
EU1(R,L) ≥ EU1(D,L)
0.5− 0.5c ≥ 0.5(T − r(c+ T − 1)) + 0.5(1− c)(1− r)T
−(2− c)(1− r)T ≥ −(1− r)(1− c)
T ≤ 1− 1
2− c
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Note that EU1(D,L) exceeds EU1(R,L) only when T as at least
1
2 , however this expected
utility is less than that for strategy G for the same range of values (see comparison for
LN.6 and LN.7), leaving strategy R the only viable option for T ≤ 2+c−4cr4−c . Putting all
the above conditions together, the best response function for σ−i = L is given as follows:







if T ≥ 12−c ,
if 4r−2−c8r−4+c ≤ T < 12−c
if 2+c−4cr4−c ≤ T < 4r−2−c8r−4+c







if T ≥ 12−c ,
if 1−c2 ≤ T < 12−c
if T < 1−c2 ,
When σ−i = R
EU1(P,R) = −0.125c(T + 1) + 0.5T + 0.25
EU1(L,R) = 0.5c(r − 1) + 0.5
EU1(R,R) = 0.5T (2− cr)
EU1(G,R) = 0.5r + T (1− r)
EU1(D,R) = 0.5((1− c)(1− r) + rT ) + 0.5(1− c)rT
Finding the conditions for EU1(R,R) ≥ EU1(σi, R), where σi 6= R,
EU1(R,R) ≥ EU1(P,R)
0.5T (2− cr) ≥ −0.125c(T + 1) + 0.5T + 0.25
8T − 4crT ≥ −cT − c+ 4T + 2
T ≥ 2− c
4 + c− 4cr
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EU1(R,R) ≥ EU1(L,R)
0.5T (2− cr) ≥ 0.5c(r − 1) + 0.5
T (2− cr) ≥ cr − c+ 1
T ≥ cr − c+ 1
2− cr
EU1(R,R) ≥ EU1(G,R)
0.5T (2− cr) ≥ 0.5r + T (1− r)




0.5T (2− cr) ≥ 0.5((1− c)(1− r) + rT ) + 0.5(1− c)rT
T (2− cr) ≥ (1− c)(1− r) + rT + (1− c)rT
T (2− 2r) ≥ (1− c)(1− r)
T ≥ (1− c)
2
Comparing the conditions for EU1(R,R) ≥ EU1(P,R) : 2−c4+c−4cr (RN.1), EU1(R,R) ≥
EU1(L,R) :
cr−c+1








4 + c− 4cr
4 + c− 4cr ≥ 4− 4c+ c2







cr − c+ 1
2− cr







2 ≥ (1− c)(2− c)
As r is always positive, and is between 12 and 1, any T that satisfies the condition for
EU1(R,R) ≥ EU1(G,R) also satisfies conditions RN.1, RN.2, RN.4. For T ≥ 12−c , the
best response for σ−i = R is R.
Comparing the remaining expected utilities, we find the best responses for the remaining
range of T values.
EU1(G,R) ≥ EU1(P,R)
0.5r + T (1− r) ≥ −0.125c(T + 1) + 0.5T + 0.25
4T − 8rT + cT ≥ −c+ 2− 4r
T <
2− 4r − c
4− 8r + c
EU1(G,R) ≥ EU1(L,R)
0.5r + T (1− r) ≥ 0.5c(r − 1) + 0.5
T ≥ 1− c
2
EU1(G,R) ≥ EU1(D,R)
0.5r + T (1− r) ≥ 0.5((1− c)(1− r) + rT ) + 0.5(1− c)rT
(2− 4r + cr)T ≥ 1− c− 2r + cr
T ≥ 1− c− 2r + cr
2− 4r + cr
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The conditions for EU1(G,R) ≥ EU1(P,R) : 2−4r−c4−8r+c (RN.5), EU1(G,R) ≥ EU1(L,R) :
1−c
2 (RN.6), and EU1(G,R) ≥ EU1(D,R) : 1−c−2r+cr2−4r+cr (RN.7) are compared to find the
range of T values where σi = G is the best responses.
(RN.5) ≤ (RN.6)
2− 4r − c
4− 8r + c ≤
1− c
2
4− 8r − 2c ≤ 4− 8r + c− 4c+ 8cr − c2
c ≤ 8cr − c2





≥ 1− c− 2r + cr
2− 4r + cr
2− 4r + cr − 2c+ 4cr − c2r ≥ 2− 2c− 4r + 2cr
3cr − c2r ≥ 0
r ≥ 0
As r ∈ [12 , 1], for 1−c2 ≤ T ≤ 12−c the best response for σ−i = G is G.
Comparing the remaining expected utilities, and the threshold conditions,
EU1(L,R) ≥ EU1(P,R)
0.5c(r − 1) + 0.5 ≥ −0.125c(T + 1) + 0.5T + 0.25
(c− 4)T ≥ 3c− 2− 4cr
T ≤ 2− 3c+ 4cr
4− c
EU1(L,R) ≥ EU1(D,R)
0.5c(r − 1) + 0.5 ≥ 0.5((1− c)(1− r) + rT ) + 0.5(1− c)rT
cr − c+ 1 ≥ (1− c)(1− r) + rT + (1− c)rT




Recall that EU1(G,R) ≥ EU1(L,R) : 1−c2 (RN.6); We compare this to the threshold






≤ 2− 3c+ 4cr
4− c
−5c+ c2 ≤ −6c+ 8cr
−8r ≤ −1− c







2− 3c+ c2 ≤ 2
−3 + c ≤ 0
r ≤ 3
The condition (RN.6) is more stringent than both (RN.8) and (RN.9).






if T ≥ 12−c ,
if 1−c2 ≤ T < 12−c
if T < 1−c2
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When σ−i = G
EU1(P,G) = 0.25− 0.25c+ 0.5T
EU1(L,G) = 0.5c(r − 1) + 0.5r(2T − 1) + 0.5
EU1(R,G) = 0.5r(1− c− 2T ) + T
EU1(G,G) = T
EU1(D,G) = 0.5− 0.5c
Looking at T values where EU1(G,G) ≥ EU1(σi, G), where σi 6= G.
EU1(G,G) ≥ EU1(P,G)
T ≥ 0.25− 0.25c+ 0.5T
0.5T ≥ 0.25− 0.25c
T ≥ 1− c
2
EU1(G,G) ≥ EU1(L,G)
T ≥ 0.5c(r − 1) + 0.5r(2T − 1) + 0.5
T (1− r) ≥ 0.5(1− r)(1− c)
T ≥ 1− c
2
EU1(G,G) ≥ EU1(R,G)
T ≥ 0.5r(1− c− 2T ) + T
rT ≥ 0.5r − 0.5cr




T ≥ 1− c
2
When T ≥ 1−c2 , the best response for σ−i = G is G.
We compare the expected utilities for the remaining strategies to determine the best




≥ 0.25− 0.25c+ 0.5T
−T ≥ −0.5 + 0.5c





≥ 0.5c(r − 1) + 0.5r(2T − 1) + 0.5
1− c ≥ c(r − 1) + 2rT + 1− r
−2rT ≥ −(1− c)r





≥ 0.5r(1− c− 2T ) + T
1− c ≥ r − cr − 2rT + 2T
(2r − 2)T ≥ (r − 1)(1− c)
T ≤ 1− c
2
96
The best response function for σ−i = R is shown in full below:
BRi(G) =




When σ−i = D
EU1(P,D) = 0.25T (2− c) + 0.25
EU1(L,D) = 0.5(1− c)(1− r)T + 0.5(r + T (1− r))
EU1(R,D) = 0.5r(T (2− c)− 1) + 0.5
EU1(G,D) = 0.5
EU1(D,D) = 0.5T (2− c)
We begin with looking at T values where EU1(D,D) ≥ EU1(σi, D), where σi 6= D.
EU1(D,D) ≥ EU1(P,D)
0.5T (2− c) ≥ 0.25T (2− c) + 0.25




0.5T (2− c) ≥ 0.5(1− c)(1− r)T + 0.5(r + T (1− r))




0.5T (2− c) ≥ 0.5r(T (2− c)− 1) + 0.5





0.5T (2− c) ≥ 0.5
T ≥ 1
2− c
From the above, the best response for σ−i = D when T ≥ 12−c is D. For T ≤ 12−c , the
expected utilities from the remaining strategies are compared:
EU1(G,D) ≥ EU1(P,D)
0.5 ≥ 0.25T (2− c) + 0.25




0.5 ≥ 0.5(1− c)(1− r)T + 0.5(r + T (1− r))




0.5 ≥ 0.5r(T (2− c)− 1) + 0.5
0 ≥ r(T (2− c)− 1)
T ≤ 1
2− c
When T ≤ 12−c , G is the best response. The best responses for σ−i = D is summarized
below:
BRi(D) =






The pure-strategy Bayesian Nash Equilibria for the game is computed from the best re-
sponses above.
s∗ = (σ∗1, σ∗2) ∈ S is a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium if σ∗i ∈ Bi(σ∗−i) for every i ∈ I.
From the best responses above, mutual best responses are calculated. We find that for
sufficiently large policy payoffs, T ≥ 12−c , politicians pool in equilibria with the exception
of strategy Pander. P is not an equilibrium strategy when q = 0.5. For moderate policy
payoffs, 12 − 12c ≤ T < 12−c , politicians implement the socially optimal policy. Otherwise,
politicians choose contrasting strategies. The equilibria is summarized in Proposition 1
below.
Proposition 1
When the popular choice is unclear (qi = q−i = 12) and the issue is non-salient (γ = 1),
1. If T ≥ 12−c , there exist only four possible equilibria (L,L), (R,R), (G,G), or (D,D),
2. If 12 − 12c ≤ T < 12−c , there exists a unique equilibrium (G,G),
3. If 2+c−4cr4−c ≤ T < 12 − 12c, there exists only two possible equilibria (G,D) or (D,G),
4. If T < 12 − 12c and T < 2+c−4cr4−c , there exist only four possible equilibria (R,L), (L,R),
(G,D), and (D,G).
99
C Best Responses and Equilibria:
qi = q−i = 0.5, γ = 0
The computation of the best responses of politicians when the popular opinion is unclear
on a salient issue are shown in full below.
σi is a best response to σ−i ∈ Σ, if EUi(σi, σ−i) ≥ EUi(σ′i, σ−i), ∀σ′i ∈ Σ.
When σ−i = P
EU1(P, P ) = −0.125c(T + 1) + 0.25T + 0.25
EU1(L,P ) = 0.25c(r − 1)(T + 1) + 0.25T + 0.25
EU1(R,P ) = −0.25cr(T + 1) + 0.25T + 0.25
EU1(G,P ) = 0.25T + 0.25
EU1(D,P ) = −0.25c(T + 1) + 0.25T + 0.25
Looking at T values where EU1(P, P ) ≥ EU1(σi, P ), where σi 6= P .
EU1(P, P ) ≥ EU1(L,P )
−0.125c(T + 1) + 0.25T + 0.25 ≥ 0.25c(r − 1)(T + 1) + 0.25T + 0.25
Tc(1− 2r) ≥ c(2r − 1)
T ≤ −1
EU1(P, P ) ≥ EU1(R,P )
−0.125c(T + 1) + 0.25T + 0.25 ≥ −0.25cr(T + 1) + 0.25T + 0.25
Tc(2r − 1) ≥ −c(2r − 1)
T > −1
EU1(P, P ) ≥ EU1(G,P )
−0.125c(T + 1) + 0.25T + 0.25 ≥ 0.25T + 0.25
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−0.125c(T + 1) ≥ 0
T ≤ −1
EU1(P, P ) ≥ EU1(D,P )
−0.125c(T + 1) + 0.25T + 0.25 ≥ −0.25c(T + 1) + 0.25T + 0.25
−0.125c(T + 1) ≥ −0.25c(T + 1)
0.125cT ≥ −0.125c
T > −1
As with non-salient issues, for all possible values of T ∈ [0, 1], expected utilities under
Pander, σi = P are always greater than those under strategies Right (R) and Destructive
(D). As T is always nonnegative, strategies Left (L) and Good (G) are more attractive
than Pander. We obtain the best response for σ−i = P by comparing expected utilities
for strategies L and G.
EU1(G,P ) ≥ EU1(L,P )
0.25T + 0.25 ≥ 0.25c(r − 1)(T + 1) + 0.25T + 0.25
0 ≥ 0.25c(r − T + rT − 1)
T (1− r) ≥ r − 1
T ≥ −1
As T ∈ [0, 1] , the strategy Good will always be chosen by the politician when the opponent
chooses Pander.
BRi(P ) = G
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When σ−i = L
EU1(P,L) = −0.125c(T + 1) + 0.25T + 0.25
EU1(L,L) = 0.5T (1− c(1− r))
EU1(R,L) = 0.5− 0.5cr
EU1(G,L) = 0.5 + 0.5r(T − 1)
EU1(D,L) = 0.5(1− c)((1− r)T + r)
Finding the conditions for EU1(L,L) ≥ EU1(σi, L), where σi 6= L,
EU1(L,L) ≥ EU1(P,L)
0.5T (1− c(1− r)) ≥ −0.125c(T + 1) + 0.25T + 0.25
T ≥ 2− c
2− 3c+ 4cr
EU1(L,L) ≥ EU1(R,L)
0.5T (1− c(1− r)) ≥ 0.5− 0.5cr
T ≥ 1− cr
1− c+ cr
EU1(L,L) ≥ EU1(G,L)
0.5T (1− c(1− r)) ≥ 0.5 + 0.5r(T − 1)




0.5T (1− c(1− r)) ≥ 0.5(1− c)((1− r)T + r)
T (1− c(1− r)− (1− c)(1− r)) ≥ (1− c)r
T ≥ 1− c
Note that although σi = L provides larger expected utility values in comparison to strate-
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gies R and D when T ≥ 1 − c , strategy Good will always provide a higher payoff than
Left as T ≤ 1.
Comparing expected utilities for strategies Right, Destructive, and Good, we find the range
of values under which EU1(G,L) is the best response.
EU1(G,L) ≥ EU1(D,L)
0.5 + 0.5r(T − 1) ≥ 0.5(1− c)((1− r)T + r)
T (2r − 1 + c− cr) ≥ 2r − cr − 1
T ≥ 2r − cr − 1
2r − 1 + c− cr
EU1(G,L) ≥ EU1(R,L)
0.5 + 0.5r(T − 1) ≥ 0.5− 0.5cr
1 + rT − r ≥ 1− cr
T ≥ 1− c
EU1(R,L) ≥ EU1(D,L)
0.5− 0.5cr ≥ 0.5(1− c)((1− r)T + r)




0.5 + 0.5r(T − 1) ≥ −0.125c(T + 1) + 0.25T + 0.25
4 + 4rT − 4r ≥ −cT − c+ 2T + 2
4rT + cT − 2T ≥ 4r − c− 2
T ≥ 4r − 2− c
4r − 2 + c
As the maximum T value is 1, T ≤ 11−c , expected utility under R is always higher than D
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for σ−i = L. For all T ≥ 1− c and T ≥ 4r−2−c4r−2+c , G is the best response for σ−i = L.
To complete the best response for σ−i = L, the expected utilities under strategies Pander,
Right, and Destructive are also compared.
EU1(P,L) ≥ EU1(R,L)
−0.125c(T + 1) + 0.25T + 0.25 ≥ 0.5− 0.5cr
−cT − c+ 2T ≥ 2− 4cr
T ≥ 2 + c− 4cr
2− c
EU1(P,L) ≥ EU1(D,L)
−0.125c(T + 1) + 0.25T + 0.25 ≥ 0.5(1− c)(T (1− r) + r)
T (−2 + 3c+ 4r − 4cr) ≥ 4r − 4cr − 2 + c
T ≥ 2− c− 4r + 4cr
2− 3c− 4r + 4cr
EU1(R,L) ≥ EU1(D,L)
0.5− 0.5cr ≥ 0.5(1− c)(T (1− r) + r)
−T (1− c)(1− r) ≥ −1 + r
T ≤ 1
1− c
From the above, when 2+c−4cr2−c ≥ T < 4r−2−c4r−2+c , P is the best resposnes. Recall that for







if T ≥ 1− c andT ≥ 4r−2−c4r−2+c ,
if 2+c−4cr2−c ≥ T < 4r−2−c4r−2+c ,
if T < 1− c andT < 2+c−4cr2−c ,
When σ−i = R
EU1(P,R) = −0.125c(T + 1) + 0.25T + 0.25
EU1(L,R) = 0.5c(r − 1) + 0.5
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EU1(R,R) = 0.5T (1− cr)
EU1(G,R) = 0.5r + 0.5(1− r)T
EU1(D,R) = 0.5(1− c)(1− r(1− T ))
Finding the conditions for EU1(R,R) ≥ EU1(σi, R), where σi 6= R,
EU1(R,R) ≥ EU1(P,R)
0.5T (1− cr) ≥ −0.125c(T + 1) + 0.25T + 0.25
T (2− 4cr + c) ≥ 2− c
T ≥ 2− c
2 + c− 4cr
EU1(R,R) ≥ EU1(L,R)
0.5T (1− cr) ≥ 0.5c(r − 1) + 0.5
T ≥ 1 + cr − c
1− cr
EU1(R,R) ≥ EU1(G,R)
0.5T (1− cr) ≥ 0.5r + 0.5(1− r)T




0.5T (1− cr) ≥ 0.5(1− c)(1− r + rT ))
T (1− r) ≥ (1− c)(1− r)
T ≥ (1− c)
As T ∈ [0, 1], EU1(G,R) is always greater than EU1(R,R). EU1(R,R) is greater than
both EU1(D,R) and EU1(L,R) when it satisfies the condition for T ≥ 1+cr−c1−cr . To find
the T interval where G is the best response, we compare expected utilities under L and D
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to that of G.
EU1(G,R) ≥ EU1(L,R)
0.5r + 0.5(1− r)T ≥ 0.5c(r − 1) + 0.5
(1− r)T ≥ cr − c+ 1− r
T ≥ 1− c
EU1(G,R) ≥ EU1(D,R)
0.5r + 0.5(1− r)T ≥ 0.5(1− c)(1− r + rT ))
T (1− 2r + cr) ≥ (1− c)(1− r)
T ≥ 1− c− 2r + cr
1− 2r + cr
EU1(G,R) ≥ EU1(P,R)
0.5r + 0.5(1− r)T ≥ −0.125c(T + 1) + 0.25T + 0.25
T ≥ 2− c− 4r
2 + c− 4r
Comparing the conditions for EU1(G,R) ≥ EU1(L,R) : 1 − c RS.1 and EU1(G,R) ≥
EU1(P,R) :
2−c−4r
2+c−4r RS.2 to see which one is more stringent,
RS.1 ≥ RS.2
1− c ≥ 2− c− 4r
2 + c− 4r
−c2 + 4cr ≥ 0
r ≥ c
4
As r ≥ 12 and c ∈ [0, 1], the condition RS.1 is more stringent. If EU1(G,R) ≥ EU1(L,R),
then EU1(G,R) ≥ EU1(P,R).
The best response for σ−i = R is G when T ≥ 1− c .
From the expected utilities of the remaining strategies, we find the remaining conditions
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to complete the best response function.
EU1(L,R) ≥ EU1(D,R)
0.5c(r − 1) + 0.5 ≥ 0.5(1− c)(1− r + rT ))




0.5c(r − 1) + 0.5 ≥ −0.125c(T + 1) + 0.25T + 0.25
4cr − 3c+ 2 ≥ −cT + 2T
T ≤ 4cr − 3c+ 2
2− c
Comparing the conditions for EU1(L,R) ≥ EU1(P,R) : 4cr−3c+22−c RS.3 and RS.1, the
more stringent condition, that is the lower threshold, determines the range of values for T
RS.1 ≤ RS.3





As r is always greater than c4 , σi = L is the best response for σ−i = R when T < 1− c
The best response function for σ−i = R is given as follows
BRi(R) =
 GL if T ≥ 1− c,if T < 1− c.
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When σ−i = G
EU1(P,G) = −0.25c+ 0.25T + 0.25
EU1(L,G) = 0.5c(r − 1) + 0.5r(T − 1) + 0.5
EU1(R,G) = −0.5cr + 0.5(r + T (1− r))
EU1(G,G) = 0.5T
EU1(D,G) = 0.5− 0.5c
Finding the conditions for EU1(G,G) ≥ EU1(σi, G), where σi 6= G,
EU1(G,G) ≥ EU1(P,G)
0.5T ≥ −0.25c+ 0.25T + 0.25
2T ≥ −c+ T + 1
T ≥ 1− c
EU1(G,G) ≥ EU1(L,G)
0.5T ≥ 0.5c(r − 1) + 0.5r(T − 1) + 0.5
(1− r)T ≥ (1− r)(1− c)
T ≥ 1− c
EU1(G,G) ≥ EU1(R,G)
0.5T ≥ −0.5cr + 0.5(r + T (1− r))
rT ≥ −cr + r
T ≥ 1− c
EU1(G,G) ≥ EU1(D,G)
0.5T ≥ 0.5− 0.5c
T ≥ 1− c
When T ≥ 1 − c, σi = G is the best response for σ−i = G. Comparing the expected
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utilities of the remaining strategies,
EU1(D,G) ≥ EU1(P,G)
0.5− 0.5c ≥ −0.25c+ 0.25T + 0.25
2 ≥ T + 1
T < 1
EU1(D,G) ≥ EU1(L,G)
0.5− 0.5c ≥ 0.5c(r − 1) + 0.5r(T − 1) + 0.5
r(1− c) ≥ rT
T < 1− c
EU1(D,G) ≥ EU1(R,G)
0.5− 0.5c ≥ −0.5cr + 0.5(r + T (1− r))
1− c ≥ −cr + r + (1− r)T
T < 1− c
When T < 1− c, D provides the highest expected utility. The best response function for
σ−i = G is given as follows
BRi(G) =
 GD if T ≥ 1− c,if T < 1− c.
When σ−i = D
EU1(P,D) = 0.25T (1− c) + 0.25
EU1(L,D) = 0.5c(r − 1)T + 0.5(r + T (1− r))
EU1(R,D) = 0.5r(T (1− c)− 1) + 0.5
EU1(G,D) = 0.5
EU1(D,D) = 0.5T (1− c)
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The pure-strategy Bayesian Nash Equilibria for the game is computed from the best re-
sponses above.
s∗ = (σ∗1, σ∗2) ∈ S is a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium if σ∗i ∈ Bi(σ∗−i) for every i ∈ I.
From the best responses above, mutual best responses are calculated. We find that for
sufficiently large policy payoffs, T ≥ 1−c, only the socially optimal policy is implemented.
For lower levels of policy benefit, politicians diverge strategically, choosing contrasting
strategies. The equilibria is summarized in Proposition 2 below.
Proposition 2
When the popular choice is unclear (qi = q−i = 12) and the issue is salient (γ = 0),
1. If T ≥ 1− c, there exists a unique equilibrium (G,G),
2. If 2+c−4cr2−c ≤ T < 1− c, there exists only two possible equilibria (G,D) or (D,G),
3. If T < 1 − c and T < 2+c−4cr2−c , there exists only four possible equilibria (R,L), (L,R),
(G,D) or (D,G).
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D Best Responses and Equilibria:
qi = q−i = 1, γ = 1
The computation of the best responses of politicians when the popular opinion is clear on
a non-salient issue are shown in full below.
Substituting qi = q−i = 1, γ = 1 to the expected utilities above, the best responses for all
possible opponent strategies: Σi = {P, L, R, G, D} are shown in full for politician 1.
When σ−i = P
EU1(P, P ) = (1− 0.5c)T
EU1(L,P ) = 0.5T − 0.5c(1− r)T
EU1(R,P ) = (0.5− 0.5cr)T
EU1(G,P ) = 0.5T
EU1(D,P ) = (0.5− 0.5c)T
Finding the conditions for EU1(P, P ) ≥ EU1(σi, P ), where σi 6= P ,
EU1(P, P ) ≥ EU1(L,P )
(1− 0.5c)T ≥ 0.5T − 0.5c(1− r)T
T ≥ crT
T ≥ 0
EU1(P, P ) ≥ EU1(R,P )
(1− 0.5c)T ≥ (0.5− 0.5cr)T
T ≥ 0
EU1(P, P ) ≥ EU1(G,P )
(1− 0.5c)T ≥ 0.5T
T ≥ 0
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EU1(P, P ) ≥ EU1(D,P )
(1− 0.5c)T ≥ (0.5− 0.5c)T
T ≥ 0
From the above, for all possible combinations of T , r, and c , P provides the highest
expected utility when σ−i = P .
BRi(P ) = P
When σ−i = L
EU1(P,L) = 0.5− 0.5cr + 0.5T − 0.5c(1− r)T
EU1(L,L) = (1− 0.5c(1− r))T
EU1(R,L) = 0.5− 0.5cr
EU1(G,L) = 0.5− r(0.5− T )
EU1(D,L) = r(0.5− 0.5c(1− T )− T ) + (1− 0.5c)T
Finding the conditions for EU1(L,L) ≥ EU1(σi, L), where σi 6= L,
EU1(L,L) ≥ EU1(P,L)
(1− 0.5c(1− r))T ≥ 0.5− 0.5cr + 0.5T − 0.5c(1− r)T
T ≥ 1− cr
EU1(L,L) ≥ EU1(R,L)
(1− 0.5c(1− r))T ≥ 0.5− 0.5cr




(1− 0.5c(1− r))T ≥ 0.5− r(0.5− T )




(1− 0.5c(1− r))T ≥ r(0.5− 0.5c(1− T )− T ) + (1− 0.5c)T
(2− c)(1− r)T ≥ 1− r
T ≥ 1
2− c
As the condition for EU1(L,L) ≥ EU1(P,L), T ≥ 1 − cr, is more stringent than that of
EU1(L,L) ≥ EU1(R,L), wefind that for T ≥ 1 − cr and T ≥ 12−c , L is the best response
for σ−i = L.
We compare the remaining expected utilities to find the best responses for T < 1− cr and
T < 12−c ,
EU1(P,L) ≥ EU1(R,L)
0.5− 0.5cr + 0.5T − 0.5c(1− r)T ≥ 0.5− 0.5cr
(1− c+ cr)T ≥ 0
T ≥ 0
EU1(P,L) ≥ EU1(G,L)
0.5− 0.5cr + 0.5T − 0.5c(1− r)T ≥ 0.5− r(0.5− T )
T (1− c+ cr − 2r) ≥ cr − r
T ≤ cr − r
1− c+ cr − 2r
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EU1(P,L) ≥ EU1(D,L)
0.5− 0.5cr + 0.5T − 0.5c(1− r)T ≥ r(0.5− 0.5c(1− T )− T ) + (1− 0.5c)T
T ≥ 1− r
1− 2r
Note that as 1−r1−2r < 0, EU1(P,L) ≥ EU1(D,L) for all T . From the results above, the






if T ≥ 1− cr andT ≥ 12−c ,
if cr−r1−c+cr−2r ≥ T < 12−c ,
if T < 1− cr andT ≤ cr−r1−c+cr−2r
When σ−i = R
EU1(P,R) = 0.5 + c(−0.5 + 0.5r(1− T )) + 0.5T
EU1(L,R) = 0.5 + c(−0.5 + 0.5r)
EU1(R,R) = (1− 0.5cr)T
EU1(G,R) = r(0.5− T ) + T
EU1(D,R) = 0.5 + c(−0.5 + r(0.5− 0.5T ))− r(0.5− T )
Finding the conditions for EU1(R,R) ≥ EU1(σi, R), where σi 6= R,
EU1(R,R) ≥ EU1(P,R)
(1− 0.5cr)T ≥ 0.5 + c(−0.5 + 0.5r(1− T )) + 0.5T
T ≥ 1− c+ cr
EU1(R,R) ≥ EU1(G,R)
(1− 0.5cr)T ≥ 0.5− 0.5cr + 0.5T − 0.5c(1− r)T
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(1− 0.5cr)T ≥ 0.5 + c(−0.5 + 0.5r)
T ≥ 1− c+ cr
2− cr
EU1(R,R) ≥ EU1(D,R)
(1− 0.5cr)T ≥ 0.5 + c(−0.5 + r(0.5− 0.5T ))− r(0.5− T )
T ≥ 1− c
2
When T ≥ 1−c+cr and T ≥ 12−c , strategy Right provides politicians with largest expected
utility.
Comparing expected utilities for σ−i = R, we find the best responses for the remaining
values of T :
EU1(P,R) ≥ EU1(L,R)
0.5 + c(−0.5 + 0.5r(1− T )) + 0.5T ≥ 0.5 + c(−0.5 + 0.5r)
T ≥ 0
EU1(P,R) ≥ EU1(G,R)
0.5 + c(−0.5 + 0.5r(1− T )) + 0.5T ≥ r(0.5− T ) + T
T ≤ (r − 1)(1− c)
2r − 1− cr
EU1(P,R) ≥ EU1(D,R)
0.5 + c(−0.5 + 0.5r(1− T )) + 0.5T ≥ 0.5 + c(−0.5 + r(0.5− 0.5T ))− r(0.5− T )
T ≤ r
2r − 1
Note that as r2r−1 > 1, EU1(P,R) ≥ EU1(D,R) for all T . From the results above, the
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if T ≥ 1− c+ cr andT ≥ 12−c ,
if (r−1)(1−c)2r−1−cr ≥ T < 12−cand,
if T < 1− c+ cr andT ≤ (r−1)(1−c)2r−1−cr
When σ−i = G
EU1(P,G) = 0.5− 0.5c+ 0.5T
EU1(L,G) = 0.5 + c(−0.5 + 0.5r) + r(−0.5 + T )
EU1(R,G) = r(0.5− 0.5c− T ) + T
EU1(G,G) = T
EU1(D,G) = 0.5− 0.5c
Finding the conditions for EU1(G,G) ≥ EU1(σi, G), where σi 6= G,
EU1(G,G) ≥ EU1(P,G)
T ≥ 0.5− 0.5c+ 0.5T
T ≥ 1− c
EU1(G,G) ≥ EU1(L,G)
T ≥ 0.5 + c(−0.5 + 0.5r) + r(−0.5 + T )
T (1− r) ≥ 0.5(1− c)(1− r)
T ≥ 1− c
2
EU1(G,G) ≥ EU1(R,G)
rT ≥ r(0.5− 0.5c)




T ≥ 1− c
2
When T ≥ 1− c, G is the best response to σ−i = G.
Comparing the utilities for the remaining strategies,
EU1(P,G) ≥ EU1(L,G)
0.5− 0.5c+ 0.5T ≥ 0.5 + c(−0.5 + 0.5r) + r(−0.5 + T )
T (r − 0.5) ≥ 0.5cr − 0.5r
T ≥ cr − r
2r − 1
EU1(P,G) ≥ EU1(R,G)
0.5− 0.5c+ 0.5T ≥ r(0.5− 0.5c)
T ≥ (r − 1)(0.5− 0.5c)
T ≥ (1− c)(r − 1)
EU1(P,G) ≥ EU1(D,G)
0.5− 0.5c+ 0.5T ≥ 1− c
2
T ≥ 0
The constraints above are either zero or negative. For the remaining T values, T < 1− c,
P is the best response.
BRi(G) =
 GP if T ≥ 1− c,otherwise
When σ−i = D
EU1(P,D) = 0.5 + (0.5− 0.5c)T
EU1(L,D) = (1− r)(1− 0.5c)T + 0.5r
EU1(R,D) = 0.5 + r(−0.5 + (1− 0.5c)T )
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EU1(G,D) = 0.5
EU1(D,D) = (1− 0.5c)T
Finding the conditions for EU1(D,D) ≥ EU1(σi, D), where σi 6= D,
EU1(D,D) ≥ EU1(P,D)








(1− 0.5c)T ≥ 0.5 + r(−0.5 + (1− 0.5c)T )




(1− 0.5c)T ≥ 0.5
T ≥ 0
From the above, we find that Pander dominates Destructive and Destructive dominates
Good for σ−i = D. Comparing the expected utility of strategy Pander to those of the
remaining strategies,
EU1(P,D) ≥ EU1(L,D)
0.5 + (0.5− 0.5c)T ≥ (1− r)(1− 0.5c)T + 0.5r − 0.5
(−0.5 + r − 0.5cr)T ≥ 0.5r − 1
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T ≤ 2− r
1− 2r + cr
EU1(P,D) ≥ EU1(R,D)
0.5 + (0.5− 0.5c)T ≥ 0.5 + r(−0.5 + (1− 0.5c)T )
(0.5− 0.5c)T ≥ r(−0.5 + (1− 0.5c)T )
T ≥ 0
EU1(P,D) ≥ EU1(G,D)
0.5 + (0.5− 0.5c)T ≥ 0.5
T ≥ 0
For T ≥ 0.5, EU1(P,D) ≥ EU1(D,D) ≥ EU1(L,D). Checking if EU1(P,D) ≥ EU1(L,D)
for T < 0.5,
0.5 ≤ 2− r
1− 2r + cr
0.5cr ≤ 1.5
cr ≤ 3
As cr is always less than 3, and T ≥ 0, then for T < 0.5, P is the best response.
BRi(D) = P
D.1 Equilibria
The pure-strategy Bayesian Nash Equilibria for the game is computed from the best re-
sponses above.
s∗ = (σ∗1, σ∗2) ∈ S is a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium if σ∗i ∈ Bi(σ∗−i) for every i ∈ I.
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When the issue is non-salient and the popular choice is clear, Pander is always an equi-
librium action, and the popular policy is implemented. At sufficiently high policy payoffs,
other policies may also be implemented The equilibria is summarized in Proposition 3
below.
Proposition 3
When the popular choice is clear (qi = q−i = 1) and the issue is non-salient (γ = 1),
1. (P,P) is always an equilibrium
2. If T ≥ 1− c, there exists an equilibrium (G,G) ,
3. If T ≥ 1− cr and T ≥ 12−c , there exists an equilibrium (L,L) , and
4. If T ≥ 1− c(1− r) and T ≥ 12−c , there exists an equilibrium (R,R).
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E Best Responses and Equilibria:
qi = q−i = 1, γ = 0
The computation of the best responses of politicians when the popular opinion is clear on
a salient issue are shown in full below.
Substituting qi = q−i = 1, γ = 0 to the expected utilities above, the best responses for all
possible opponent strategies: Σi = {P, L, R, G, D} are shown in full for politician 1.
When σ−i = P
EU1(P, P ) = (1− 0.5c)T
EU1(L,P ) = 0.5T − 0.5c(1− r)T
EU1(R,P ) = (0.5− 0.5cr)T
EU1(G,P ) = 0.5T
EU1(D,P ) = (0.5− 0.5c)T
The expected utilities for each σi, given σ−i = P and q = 1, are the same for both γ = 0
and γ = 1. Based on the results of the previous section, the best response function for
σ−i = P is as follows.
BRi(P ) = P
When σ−i = L
EU1(P,L) = 0.5− 0.5cr + 0.5T − 0.5c(1− r)T
EU1(L,L) = 0.5T − 0.5c(1− r)T
EU1(R,L) = 0.5− 0.5cr
EU1(G,L) = 0.5 + r(−0.5 + 0.5T )
EU1(D,L) = 0.5(1− c)(T (1− r) + r)
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Finding the conditions for EU1(L,L) ≥ EU1(σi, L), where σi 6= L,
EU1(L,L) ≥ EU1(P,L)
0.5T − 0.5c(1− r)T ≥ 0.5− 0.5cr + 0.5T − 0.5c(1− r)T
0 ≥ 1− cr
cr ≥ 1
EU1(L,L) ≥ EU1(R,L)
0.5T − 0.5c(1− r)T ≥ 0.5− 0.5cr
T ≥ 1− cr
1− c+ cr
EU1(L,L) ≥ EU1(G,L)
0.5T − 0.5c(1− r)T ≥ 0.5 + r(−0.5 + 0.5T )




0.5T − 0.5c(1− r)T ≥ 0.5(1− c)(T (1− r) + r)
(1− c+ cr)T ≥ (1− c)(1− r)T + (1− c)r
T ≥ 1− c
From the above, we find that the strategies Pander and Good always provides politicians
with a higher expected utility than Left. When T ≥ 1 − c, L provides a higher expected
utility than strategies R and D.
Comparing EU1(P,L) and EU1(G,L),
EU1(P,L) ≥ EU1(G,L)
0.5− 0.5cr + 0.5T − 0.5c(1− r)T ≥ 0.5 + r(−0.5 + 0.5T )




As T ∈ [0, 1], EU1(P,L) ≥ EU1(G,L) for all T . Comparing the expected utilities of the
remaining strategies R and D to P,
EU1(P,L) ≥ EU1(R,L)
0.5− 0.5cr + 0.5T − 0.5c(1− r)T ≥ 0.5− 0.5cr
(1− c+ cr)T ≥ 0
T ≥ 0
EU1(P,L) ≥ EU1(D,L)
0.5− 0.5cr + 0.5T − 0.5c(1− r)T ≥ 0.5(1− c)(T (1− r) + r)
T ≥ r − 1
r
P dominates both strategies for all possible values of T .
BRi(L) = P
When σ−i = R
EU1(P,R) = 0.5 + c(−0.5 + 0.5r(1− T )) + 0.5T
EU1(L,R) = 0.5 + c(−0.5 + 0.5r)
EU1(R,R) = (0.5− 0.5cr)T
EU1(G,R) = r(0.5− 0.5T ) + 0.5T
EU1(D,R) = 0.5(1− c)(1 + r(T − 1))
Finding the conditions for EU1(P,R) ≥ EU1(σi, R), where σi 6= P ,
EU1(P,R) ≥ EU1(L,R)
0.5 + c(−0.5 + 0.5r(1− T )) + 0.5T ≥ 0.5 + c(−0.5 + 0.5r)




0.5 + c(−0.5 + 0.5r(1− T )) + 0.5T ≥ (0.5− 0.5cr)T




0.5 + c(−0.5 + 0.5r(1− T )) + 0.5T ≥ r(0.5− 0.5T ) + 0.5T
(r − cr)T ≥ −(1− c)(1− r)
T ≥ r − 1
r
EU1(P,R) ≥ EU1(D,R)
0.5 + c(−0.5 + 0.5r(1− T )) + 0.5T ≥ 0.5(1− c)(1 + r(T − 1))
(1− r)T ≥ −r
T ≥ −r
1− r
As c ∈ [0, 1], and T is non-negative, P is the best response for σ−i = R.
BRi(R) = P
When σ−i = G
EU1(P,G) = 0.5− 0.5c+ 0.5T
EU1(L,G) = 0.5 + c(−0.5 + 0.5r) + r(−0.5 + 0.5T )
EU1(R,G) = −0.5cr + 0.5(r + T − rT )
EU1(G,G) = 0.5T
EU1(D,G) = 0.5− 0.5c
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Finding the conditions for EU1(P,G) ≥ EU1(σi, G), where σi 6= P ,
EU1(P,G) ≥ EU1(L,G)
0.5− 0.5c+ 0.5T ≥ 0.5 + c(−0.5 + 0.5r) + r(−0.5 + 0.5T )
(1− r)T ≥ cr − r
T ≥ r(c− 1)
1− r
EU1(P,G) ≥ EU1(R,G)
0.5− 0.5c+ 0.5T ≥ −0.5cr + 0.5(r + T − rT )
1− c− r + cr ≥ −rT
T ≥ −(1− c)(1− r)
r
EU1(P,G) ≥ EU1(G,G)
0.5− 0.5c+ 0.5T ≥ 0.5T
c ≤ 1
EU1(P,G) ≥ EU1(D,G)
0.5− 0.5c+ 0.5T ≥ 0.5− 0.5c
T ≥ 0
As the conditions are above are either zero on negative for T , and c ∈ [0, 1], P provides
the highest expected utility value for σ−i = G.
BRi(G) = P
When σ−i = D
EU1(P,D) = 0.5 + (0.5− 0.5c)T
EU1(L,D) = 0.5c(−1 + r)T + 0.5(r + T − rT )
EU1(R,D) = 0.5 + r(−0.5 + (0.5− 0.5c)T )
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EU1(G,D) = 0.5
EU1(D,D) = (0.5− 0.5c)T
Finding the conditions for EU1(P,D) ≥ EU1(σi, D), where σi 6= P ,
EU1(P,D) ≥ EU1(L,D)
0.5 + (0.5− 0.5c)T ≥ 0.5c(−1 + r)T + 0.5(r + T − rT )
(r − cr)T ≥ +r − 1
T ≥ r − 1
r − cr
EU1(P,D) ≥ EU1(R,D)
0.5 + (0.5− 0.5c)T ≥ 0.5 + r(−0.5 + (0.5− 0.5c)T )




0.5 + (0.5− 0.5c)T ≥ 0.5
T ≥ 0
EU1(P,D) ≥ EU1(D,D)
0.5 + (0.5− 0.5c)T ≥ (0.5− 0.5c)T
0.5 ≥ 0




The pure-strategy Bayesian Nash Equilibria for the game is computed from the best re-
sponses above.
s∗ = (σ∗1, σ∗2) ∈ S is a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium if σ∗i ∈ Bi(σ∗−i) for every i ∈ I.
The best response for all possible strategies in Σ−i is P, given γ = 0 and q = 1. We
summarize the findings in Proposition 4 below.
Proposition 4
When the popular choice is clear and the issue is salient (γ = 0), both politicians will
pander in equilibrium (P,P).
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F Comparative Statics
The expected utilities are expected to change as the accuracy of the information on the
socially optimal state, r, increases. The variation of payoffs for both q = 0.5 and q = 1
are examined first through obtaining the first derivatives of expected utilities given r.
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∂EU1(R,D)
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Comparing the first derivatives above, I find that the first derivative values are the same
for q = 0.5 and q = 1 with the exception of σi = P for opponent strategies L and R. When
q = 1, pandering is more likely to occur as politicians know for certain what the popular
choice is. For strategy profiles in Si that is a combination of strategies P, G, and D, there
are no effects in the change of r.
We summarize the effect of variations in r on expected utilities in the table below:
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Changes in Expected Utility given ↑ r
EU1(σi, σ−i) q = 0.5 q = 1
EU1(P, P ) no effect no effect
EU1(L,P ) ↑ ↑
EU1(R,P ) ↓ ↓
EU1(G,P ) no effect no effect
EU1(D,P ) no effect no effect
EU1(P,L) no effect ↓
EU1(L,L) ↑ ↑
EU1(R,L) ↓ ↓
EU1(G,L) ↑, if T > 11+γ ↑, if T > 11+γ
EU1(D,L) ↑, if T < 1−c1−c+γ ↑, T < 1−c1−c+γ
EU1(P,R) no effect ↑
EU1(L,R) ↑ ↑
EU1(R,R) ↓ ↓
EU1(G,R) ↑, if T < 11+γ ↑, if T < 11+γ
EU1(D,R) ↑, if T > 1−c1−c+γ ↑, T > 1−c1−c+γ
EU1(P,R) no effect ↑
EU1(L,R) ↑ ↑
EU1(R,R) ↓ ↓
EU1(G,R) ↑, if T < 11+γ ↑, if T < 11+γ
EU1(D,R) ↑, if T > 1−c1−c+γ ↑, T > 1−c1−c+γ
EU1(P,G) no effect no effect
EU1(L,G) ↑, if T > 1−c1+γ ↑, if T > 1−c1+γ
EU1(R,G) ↑, if T < 1−c1+γ ↑, if T < 1−c1+γ
EU1(G,G) no effect no effect
EU1(D,G) no effect no effect
EU1(P,D) no effect no effect
EU1(L,D) ↑, if T < 11−c+γ ↑, if T < 11−c+γ
EU1(R,D) ↑, if T > 11−c+γ ↑, if T > 11−c+γ
EU1(G,D) no effect no effect
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We consider a model of lobbying where two opposing lobbyists vye for the support
of a legislator with uncertain preferences. Lobbyist bids are only considered when
the integrity threshold of the legislator is met. When the degree of uncertainty about
the legislator is low, lobbyists bid aggressively. Conversely, if the degree of uncer-
tainty is high, the possibility of overbidding is high enough to have the lobbyists bid
conservatively. When the degree of uncertainty is moderate, we find asymmetric equi-
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1 Introduction
Lobbying is ubiquitous in most legislative systems. Other forms of lobbying, such as
shadow lobbying, also exist outside legal bounds - influencing policy outcomes without
oversight. Lobbying effects in legislation are often studied through majoritarian systems
and overall policy outcomes. The process in which lobbying influences legislation, how-
ever, is not yet fully understood. Since the Abramoff lobbying scandal in 2006, there has
been a significant effort to regulate lobbying in the United States. The number of regis-
tered lobbyists have consistently decreased from 2007, however, spending on lobbying has
continued to increase and has remained above the $3 billion mark since 2008 (Center for
Responsive Politics, 2018).
This paper aims to study the effects of uncertainty in lobbyist behaviour. We approach the
lobbying process as one where cash-for-favour exchanges occur as a means to obtain access
to legislators. The model takes into account the degree of uncertainty on a non-strategic
legislator’s preference, the legislator’s level of integrity, and the perceived advantages each
lobbyist may have on their respective policies. Instead, we adopt a simultaneous lobbying
structure to capture how lobbying proceeds behind closed doors. Under shadow lobbying,
where lobbyist- legislator interactions are kept private, the opportunity for lobbyists to
counteroffer may not exist. The simultaneous lobbying approach takes this into account
and retains focus on how interactions center on the uncertainty of legislator preferences.
In this paper, we find that the degree of uncertainty of legislator preferences, given by the
length of the bias intervals, directly affects the bidding strategy of lobbyists. At low levels
of uncertainty, lobbyists bid aggressively. The bias of the legislator is not high enough to
risk losing the legislator’s support. Each lobbyist ensures that they bid high enough to stay
competitive. Conversely, we find that if the uncertainty sufficiently high, the lobbyists take
a chance and bid more conservatively. Under moderate levels of uncertainty, the lobbyists
bid just enough to ensure that the legislator chooses a policy to support. We also observe
asymmetric equilibria under moderate level of uncertainty.
The paper moves away from the sequential lobbying structure introduced by Groseclose
and Snyder (1996). Opposing lobbyists may not be able to provide a counteroffer when
lobbying proceeds behind closed doors. By using a simultaneous lobbying structure, we
take into account for the possibility counteroffers may not be feasible. We explore uncer-
tainty by focusing on lobbyist behaviour when faced with uncertain legislator preferences
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similar to Buzard and Saiegh (2016) and Dekel et al. (2006). However, uncertainty is
rarely explored on its own. We redirect the focus of the paper to lobbyist interactions over
one non-strategic legislator. We remove the dimension of budget allocation and instead
assume that the lobbyists are willing to pay at most the value of the legislator support.
The results show that uncertainty on its own can provide some good insights on how
lobbying unfolds.
Understanding the lobbying process may help provide additional insight on the lobby-
ing’s revolving-door phenomenon explored where former staffers turned lobbyists use their
connections to incumbents to push for legislation (Blanes i Vidal et al., 2012; LaPira and
Thomas, 2014; Lazarus et al., 2016) . A large body of literature exists on the effects of lob-
bying on policy outcomes, either through information or transactional exchanges (Austen-
Smith, 1993; Groseclose and Snyder, 1996; de Figueiredo, 2002; Hall and Deardorff, 2006).
Both perspectives have been widely discussed, with empirical evidence suggesting that the
effects of cash-for-favour lobbying activities are marginal (Grossman and Helpman, 1994;
Ansolabehere et al., 2003; de Figueiredo and Richter, 2013). Despite this and increased
regulation in the lobbying industry, lobbying expenditure is still substantially higher than
Political Action Campaign (PAC) contributions in the United States (Milyo et al., 2000;
de Figueiredo and Richter, 2013). Furthermore, although uncertainty is one of the key
features of the lobbying process, it has yet to be fully explored.
The preferences of legislators are often private and unknown to the lobbyists (Heberlig,
2005). Austen-Smith and Wright (1992) looked at lobbying as an information transmis-
sion at the agenda-setting and voting stages and found that when there is occassional
uncertainty on how informed the lobbyist is, more information transmission can occur.
Buzard and Saiegh (2016) however on sequential vote buying models, specifically the allo-
cation of bribes amongst three legislators. Dekel et al. (2006) looked at vote buying and
explored as an extension the presence of uncertainty in legislatures. They found that with
a large enough body of legislators, one can predict who the winning lobbyist is. Tyutin
and Zaporozhets (2017) focus on the uncertainty on legislator types in a legislature and
the interaction of the legislature and a single lobbyist.
Wright (1996, p. 72-76) introduced the continuum of access model for lobbying, where
lobbying starts with the ‘positioning’ stage, introducing themselves to legislators, before
the exchange of information occurs in the ‘messaging’ stage. (Heberlig, 2005) ran a study
on legislators approached by the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations from 1954-1975 and found mixed results on Wright’s continuum model.
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More specifically, the lobbyists appeared to gather information on legislators first, with
varied target legislators at the ‘positioning’ and ‘messaging’ stages. We incorporate the
uncertainty on the legislator preferences in our model and focus on the transition from
the ‘positioning’ to the ‘messaging’ stage - where the lobbyist secures the support of the
legislator. As policies are often he model focuses on the binary setting.
We also include a measure of the legislator’s level of integrity. As with Che and Gale
(1998), the politician does not hold an open sale for his support given restrictions on vote-
buying. Instead, the politician chooses the lobbyist that promises to contribute enough,
and if there is more than one, the most to her campaign or projects. We can think about
this from the perspective of a reputation conscious politician. A reputation conscious
politician may not want to be associated with more than one lobbying group for an issue,
and would like to be viewed as consistent and honest by her constituents. The more
controversial an issue is, the more likely it is for the politician’s threshold to be higher.
Allying one’s self to lobbyists for all issues may also look distasteful, so the politician
only considers offers from lobbyist that is substantial enough for her to support. We
call this lower limit the legislator’s integrity threshold. The integrity threshold plays an
important role in the model. The higher the threshold is, the harder it is for lobbyists to
secure politician support without taking into account the position of the politician. For
more honest politicians, the threshold is higher, as their votes are harder to secure. The
threshold can be adjusted upwards or downwards depending on the bias of the politician
on the issue at hand - hereon referred to as the bias adjusted threshold. Stronger politician
bias for a particular policy outcome reduces the integrity threshold significantly for the
corresponding lobbyist, and vice versa.
Public awareness on lobbying is centered largely on the perception of transactional lobbyist-
legislator interactions. Media reports on lobbying scandals have highlighted the prevalence
of cash-for favour exchanges despite the apparent lack of direct impact in policy outcomes.
Politicians are less likely to seek rent where there is increased scrutiny. For example, the
sectors with the highest levels of lobbying spending in the United States in the past five
years do not include hot button issues such as abortion and gun laws (Center for Respon-
sive Politics, 2017). Schneider (2012) found in his study on the role of the agenda-setter
and lobbying found that for issues with low salience, committee chairs have more incen-
tive to propose more extreme policies and reap monetary rewards. Low salience sectors,
including finance and health care, have the highest levels of lobbyist spending for 2018
(Center for Responsive Politics, 2018). Business interests, trade associations, and pro-
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fessional groups have been shown to employ more lobbyists per issue and spend more
(Baumgartner and Leech, 2001; de Figueiredo and Richter, 2013; McKay, 2012), account-
ing for 84% and 86% of total lobbying expenditures at the U.S. Federal and state level
(de Figueiredo, 2004). The views of legislators are often undisclosed in these sectors, and
this uncertainty in preferences provides politicians with opportunities for gain at the ex-
pense of the collective good. An article from the New York Times in 2013 reported that
the influence of Wall Street in Washington has grown substantially (Lipton and Protess,
2013). In one of the bills passed by the House Financial Services committee in May 2013
exempting a large portion of financial trades in new regulation, the recommendations of
Citigroup were reflected in seventy of the eighty five lines of the bill (Lipton and Prot-
ess, 2013). A better understanding of how lobbying proceeds may help in creating more
effective regulations for the industry. The impact of lobbying activities from non-profit
associations on legislation is significant enough for the US congress to attempt to legislate
restrictions on their participation in lobbying in the mid-1990s (Balassiano and Chan-
dler, 2010). Increased information on lobbying activities to the public, and the reflection
of public sentiment by non-profit associations, may influence legislator preferences, and
consequently the outcomes of the lobbying process to improve public welfare.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Sections 3
and 4 show the expected utility and the computation of best responses. The equilibrium
of the game is characterized in full in Section 5. The results are discussed in Section 6,
and the paper is concluded in Section 7. The proofs are shown in full in the appendix.
2 The Model
There is a legislator with a policy bias b, distributed b ∼ U(−d, d) where d ≥ 0, and an
integrity threshold t. A positive b indicates a legislator bias towards policy two, a negative
b indicates a preference for policy one, and at b = 0, the legislator is unbiased. The
integrity threshold dictates how costly the support of the legislator can be. The effective
integrity threshold, or the bias-adjusted threshold, changes depending on the bias of the
legislator. An increase in legislator bias for a policy decreases the bias-adjusted integrity
threshold, and vice versa.
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The legislator’s utility is given by,
UL =

p1 − t− b
p2 − t + b
0
if Lobbyist 1 wins,
if Lobbyist 2 wins,
otherwise.
Two lobbyists supporting opposing policy positions try to sway the legislator. The lobby-
ists are aware of the distribution of the legislator’s bias and know the integrity threshold.
Both simultaneously bid pi ≥ 0 for the legislator’s support. Bids are only considered by
the legislator when they are above the bias-adjusted threshold. The bid that provides the
legislator with the highest utility wins. Only the winning bid is collected. Lobbyist i gains
w ∈ R+ upon winning.
The utilities of each lobbyist i are given below 1:
U1 =
 w − p10 if p1 > t + b and p1 > p2 + 2b,otherwise.
U2 =
 w − p20 if p2 > t− b and p2 > p1 − 2b,otherwise.
The game is summarized in the simultaneous-move Bayesian game (N,P,b,u) defined for-
mally as follows:
1. There are N = {1, 2} lobbyists.
2. Lobbyists bid pi ∈ Pi = [0, w].
3. b is a realization of types for the legislator and is drawn from a uniform distribution
U(−d, d), where d ∈ R≥0.
4. u = {u1, u2} where ui is the utility function of lobbyist i.
A lobbyist only wins if the bid is considered sufficient and provides the most payoff to the
1Lobbyist i supports policy i.
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legislator. The probabilities of winning for each lobbyist are:
P (1 wins) = P (p1 > t + b) and P (p1 > p2 + 2b)
P (2 wins) = P (p2 > t− b) and P (p2 > p1 − 2b)
We begin with looking at the probability of winning for lobbyist 1,
P (1 wins) = P (p1 > t + b) and P (p1 > p2 + 2b)
= P (b < p1 − t ∩ b < p1 − p2
2
)
= P (b < min{p1 − t, p1 − p2
2
})
The conditions above can be rewritten in terms of the average bids of the legislator.
When p1 − t is greater than (p1 − p2)/2, the average bid is greater than the integrity of
the legislator threshold, ((p1 + p2)/2 > t). Doing the same for lobbyist 2, the probabilities
of winning are as follows:
P (1 wins) =
 P (b < p1 − t)P (b < p1−p22 )
if p1+p22 < t,
otherwise.
(1)
P (2 wins) =
 P (b > t− p2)P (b > p1−p22 )
if p1+p22 < t,
otherwise.
(2)
Note that as the bias of the legislator is uniformly distributed, the winning probability
functions are continuous. When the average bid is equal to the integrity threshold, P (b <
p1− t) = P (b < (p1− p2)/2), and P (b > t− p2) = P (b > (p1− p2)/2). We can rewrite the
winning probabilities from (1) and (2) as follows:






if p1+p22 ≤ t,
if p1+p22 ≥ t.
(3)
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if p1+p22 ≤ t,
if p1+p22 ≥ t.
(4)
3 Expected Utilities
The expected utility of lobbyist i is given by the probability of winning [3 and 4] and
the utility of the lobbyist, Ui. As with the probabilities, the computation of the expected
utility depends on the relationship of the average bid to the integrity threshold of the
legislator. We explore the expected utility of the lobbyists under two scenarios: one with
the average bid below the threshold ((p1 + p2)/2 ≤ t) and, another with the average bid
above the threshold ((p1 + p2)/2 ≥ t). The expected utility is continuous at the point
where the average bid is equal to the threshold ((p1 + p2)/2 = t). For each of the two
scenarios, the bids that maximize the expected utility of the lobbyist is identified. The
optimal bids when the average bid is below and above the threshold is referred to as pi
and pi, respectively.




2d (w − p1)
p1−p2+2d
4d (w − p1)
if p1+p22 ≤ t (1),
if p1+p22 ≥ t (2).
(5)
Scenario 1: Average bid below the threshold (p1+p22 ≤ t)
Given an opposing bid p2, we solve for the maximum of the expected utility (5.1). We
equate the first derivative (w−d− 2p1 + t)/2d to 0 and find p1 = (w+ t−d)/2. Note that
the function (5.1) is concave, with a second derivative, −1/d, that is always negative. In
order to remain under the threshold, the lobbyist only considers p1 ∈ [t− d, 2t− p2) given
p2.
The identification of p1 is shown graphically in figures 1 and 2. We find that p1 =
(w + t − d)/2 is only valid when (w + t − d)/2 < 2t − p2. Otherwise, p1 = 2t − p2.
Rearranging to find the p2 conditions for each p1, we have:
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Figure 1: w+t−d2 ≤ 2t− p2




if p2 ≤ 3t−w+d2 ,
otherwise.
(6)
From this, we obtain the expected utility of lobbyist one when he bids to keep the average







if p2 ≤ 3t−w+d2 ,
otherwise.
(7)
The lower bound, t − d, is the minimum possible bid for the lobbyist. One can look at
the lower bound as the lowest possible bias adjusted threshold — the legislator’s integrity
threshold, t, adjusted to account for the maximum possible bias the legislator can have for
the lobbyist −d. As the legislator only considers bids that are at least the bias adjusted
threshold, bidding below the lower bound renders lobbyist 1’s bid ineligible.
We assume that the winning valuation, w, always exceeds the minimum possible bid for
the lobbyists. If the lower bound is higher than the expected winning valuation, then no
lobbyist can bid and the game does not proceed. The lobbyist’s maximum possible bid
is his winning valuation. If the lobbyist decides to bid below the lower bound t − d, the
expected utility becomes negative. Note that the interval endpoints do not intersect as
long as p2 < t + d.
2
Scenario 2: Average bid above the threshold
Given an opposing bid p2, we solve for the maximum of the expected utility (5.2). From the
first derivative, (−2d−2p1 +p2 +w)/4d, we obtain the critical point p1 = (w+p2−2d)/2.
The function (5.2) is always concave with a negative second derivative −1/2d, therefore,
the maximum bid for the function is given by p1 = (w + p2 − 2d)/2. For the average bid
to be greater than or equal to the threshold, for any given p2, lobbyist one has to bid at
least 2t− p2 and chooses from p1 ∈ [max{p2 − 2d, 2t− p2}, w].
2When p2 ≥ t + d, lobbyist one does not choose to keep the average below the threshold. All feasible
bids will neither reach the threshold nor beat the opposing bid, and lobbyist 2 wins definitively if lobbyist
1 bids to keep the average bid below the threshold.
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Figure 3: w+p2−2d2 ≥ 2t− p2
Figure 4: w+p2−2d2 < 2t− p2
The identification of p1 is shown graphically in figures 3 and 4. We obtain the expected







if p2 ≥ 4t+2d−w3 ,
otherwise.
(8)
Under this scenario, the lobbyist must bid at least p2 − 2d for the expected utility to be
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positive. When the average bid is above or equal to the threshold, it is certain that one of
the lobbyists wins the support of the legislator. The lobbyist shifts from making sure that
the minimum eligibility condition, the bias adjusted threshold, is met to ensuring that
his bid is competitive enough to remain in the game. If both lobbyist bids exceed their
respective bias adjusted thresholds, lobbyist one only wins once his bid, adjusted with the
bias, exceeds that of his opponent (i.e. p1 − b > p2 + b). Recall that a negative bias is
advantageous for lobbyist 1, obtaining the maximum possible advantage when b = −d. For
lobbyist 1 to have an eligible bid when the average bid is above or equal to the threshold,
the bid must at least be greater than p2− 2d. The bid is capped by the winning valuation
w.
Note that the optimal bids p1 and p1 change depending on where p2 in relation to (3t −
w+d)/2 and (4t+2d−w)/3, respectively. As the minimum possible bid cannot exceed the
winning valuation, t−d ≤ w, (3t−w+d)/2 is always less than or equal to (4t+2d−w)/3.
The two threshold points, (3t − w + d)/2 and (4t − w + 2d)/3 are referred to as lower
bound and upper bound, respectively.
4 Determination of Best Responses
The lobbyist compares the expected utility he gets from bidding p1 and p1 for a given
p2, and chooses the bid that provides him with the highest utility. The best response of








if p−i ≤ 3t−w+d2 ,
if 3t−w+d2 ≤ p−i ≤ 2d+4t−w3 ,
otherwise.
(9)
We show the derivation of best responses for lobbyist 1 when the opposing bid is less than
or equal to the lower bound ((3t − w + d)/2), greater than or equal to the upper bound
(4t− w + 2d)/3, and between the lower and upper bounds.
Case 1: p2 ≤ 3t−w+d2
When the opposing bid is less than or equal to the lower bound ( p2 ≤ (3t − w + d)/2),
lobbyist 1 can choose to bid p1 = (w + t − d)/2 and keep the average bid below the
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threshold, or bid p1 = 2t − p2 and push the average to the threshold. The expected
utilities for each possible bid are compared below:
EU1(p1) = EU1(p1)
(d− t + w)2
8d
=
(d− p2 + t)(p2 − 2t + w)
2d
d2 + 9t2 + w2 + 6dt− 2dw − 6tw = 4p2(3t− w + d)− 4p22
(3t− w + d)2 = 4p2(3t− w + d)− 4p22
(2p2 − (3t− w + d))2 = 0
p2 =
3t− w + d
2
(10)
The expected utility for p1 is always higher than that of p1 when p2 is not equal to the
lower bound. The best response of lobbyist 1 when the opposing bid is below the lower
bound is to keep the average bid below the threshold and bid p1 = (w + t− d)/2.
When the opponent bid is sufficiently low, the lobbyist chooses to bid conservatively.
Increasing the bid increases the probability of winning but decrease the take home win.
As his opponent is not bidding aggressively, the lobbyist may end up paying more if he
decides to bid just enough to ensure that the game ends, p1 = 2t − p2. The increase in
the probability of winning is not enough to cover by the loss from the increase in bid.
Bidding conservatively, a lobbyist chooses to bid midway between his minimum possible
bid t− d, and his maximum possible bid w, maximising his expected utility. The lobbyist
can afford to bid conservatively as the probability of the opposing lobbyist winning is
not high enough to warrant a price war. Note that this is reflected in the best response
(w + t− d)/2, which is constant and does not change with p2.
BR1(p2) =
w + t− d
2
, when p2 ≤ 3t− w + d
2
Case 2: 3t−w+d2 < p2 <
4t+2d−w
3
For a given p2 between the lower and upper bounds ( (3t−w+d)/2 < p2 < (4t+2d−w)/3),
lobbyist 1 bids 2t − p2, as p1 = p1 = 2t − p2, and their corresponding expected utilities
equal.
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When the opposing bid is between the lower and upper bounds, the average bid is always
equal to the threshold. The lobbyist, as with the previous cases, is faced with a tradeoff
between a higher chance of winning and a lower winning payoff. When the opposing bid
is not low enough for the lobbyist to focus primarily on his eligibility as in Case 1, but
not high enough for the lobbyist to bid aggressively, the lobbyist best responds by bidding
just enough to ensure that the game ends with a winning bid.
BR1(p2) = 2t− p2, when 3t− w + d
2
≤ p2 ≤ 4t + 2d− w
3
Case 3: p2 ≥ 4t+2d−w3
If the opposing bid is greater than or equal to the upper bound ( p2 ≥ (4t + 2d − w)/3),
lobbyist one can choose to bid p1 = 2t− p2 and keep the average bid at the threshold, or
bid p1 = (w+ p2− 2d)/2 and push the bid above the threshold. The expected utilities for
the possible bids are compared below:
EU1(p1) = EU1(p1)
(d− p2 + t)(p2 − 2t + w)
2d
=
(2d− p2 + w)2
16d
−(4t + 2d− w)2 = −6p2(4t + 2d− w) + 9p22
0 = (3p2 − (4t + 2d− w))2
p2 =
4t + 2d− w
3
(11)
The expected utility for p1 is always higher than that of p1 when p2 is not equal to the
upper bound. The best response of lobbyist 1 when p2 greater than or ewaul to the upper
bound is to keep the average bid above the threshold and bid p1 = (w + p2 − 2d)/2.
When the opponent bids aggressively, the lobbyist needs to at least match his opponent’s
bias adjusted bid. The lobbyist can choose to bid conservatively, and bid just enough to
ensure that the game ends or match the opposing bid head on. Both p1 and p1 change with
p2, with p1 increasing and p1 decreasing alongside p2. The more aggressive the opposing
lobbyist bids, the more likely he is to win the support of the legislator. The lobbyist must
then increase his bid in order to have a shot at winning the support of the legislator.
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This cannot be true when the lobbyist chooses p1. By bidding conservatively, the lobbyist
becomes less likely to win the support of the lobbyist but offsets this by increasing the
take home pay through reducing the bid. The higher the p2 gets, the less likely it is
for the conservative bid to be eligible. The lobbyist needs to find a balance between the
probability of winning and the cost of the legislator’s support. He does this by choosing
to bid aggressively. the lobbyist begins with considering the minimum competitive bid,
p2 − 2d, and the maximum possible bid w, deciding to settle on a bid betwwen the two
values. In choosing p1, the lobbyist secures a significant chance of winning the legislator’s
support and enough utility once the support is won.
BR1(p2) =
w + p2 − 2d
2
, when p2 ≥ 4t + 2d− w
3
From the best responses identified in the three cases above, we find the set of best responses
for lobbyist 1. Doing the same for lobbyist 2, we find the general best response function








if p−i ≤ 3t−w+d2 ,






Let BRi(p−i) ⊂ Pi be the set of player is best response bids against p−i ∈ P−i. The Nash
Equilibrium is formally defined as follows:
Definition. Nash Equilibrium
p∗ = (p∗1, p∗2) ∈ P is a Nash Equilibrium if p∗i ∈ BRi(p∗−i) for every i ∈ N
The Nash Equilibrium from the best responses in (12) is shown in full under Proposition
1 and summarized in Figure 5.
Proposition 1. Nash Equilibria





































– p∗1 = p∗2 = t.















5. If d ≤ 12(w − t), there exists a unique nash equilibrium (p∗i , p∗−i) where for all i =
{1, 2}, p∗i = p∗−i = w − 2d.
Figure 5: Equilibrium - One Shot Game
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6 Results and Discussion
The above equilibria is obtained by checking for mutual best responses of lobbyists 1 and
2. We show the full calculation of equilibria in Appendix A. We look at the equilibria
based on the relationship of the length of the bias interval to the winning valuation w and
the legislator’s integrity threshold t. The results from Proposition 1 are discussed point
by point in this section.
Let us begin with point 1: When d ≥ w − t, both lobbyists bid (p∗i , p∗−i) = (w + t −
d)/2, (w+t−d)/2) and keep the average bid below the legislator’s bias integrity threshold,
(p∗1 + p∗2)/2 ≤ t. When the length of the bias interval is long enough (d ≥ w − t), both
lobbyists maximize their expected utilities by bidding conservatively — keeping the average
bid below the threshold. The length of the bias interval, 2d, measures the uncertainty of
the legislator bias. A longer bias interval indicates more uncertainty on the legislator
bias. The best case scenario for a lobbyist would be to have the threshold adjusted
heavily downwards by a favorable bias. Conversely, the worst possible case for the lobbyist
would be if the bias is at its most favorable for the opposing lobbyist, as this drives the
bias adjusted threshold above the winning valuation, making it impossible to win. Both
lobbyists are unaware of the actual legislator bias, but have the same information on its
distribution. As it is equally likely for both of them to be at an advantageous position, but
too costly for either one to secure a high enough probability of winning, both lobbyists bid
conservatively. The bids, and consequently the utilities of lobbyists under this scenario
do not depend on their opponents bid, and both lobbyists are equally likely to win the
legislator’s support. The lobbyist chooses to bid midway between his minimum possible
bid t− d, and his maximum possible bid w, maximising his expected utility.
The uncertainty of the legislator bias has to be sufficiently higher than the difference
between the lobbyist’s winning valuation and the legislator’s integrity threshold for the
equilibrium bids to be valid. Without uncertainty, the minimum qualifying bid is just
the integrity threshold of the legislator. An increase in the level of integrity of the leg-
islator, holding the winning valuation constant, makes it more likely the bias interval to
be sufficiently high. This may help explain why despite high levels of coverage on single
issues in the United States (e.g. gun rights vs. gun control and pro-life vs. pro-choice),
and the small degree of uncertainty on legislator preference on the issues, often earmarked
by party memberships (e.g. Republicans for gun rights and Democrats for gun control),
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lobbyist spending in the single issue sector does not reach the top five sectors with the
highest lobbying expenditure in 2018 (Center for Responsive Politics, 2018). Single issues
also come with high legislator integrity thresholds. The positions of legislators are heavily
publicised, with high costs on reputation if the legislator’s integrity is questioned. With
ideological issues, the rewards of the policy are often not as high as issues tied with indus-
try interest. Lower winning valuations coupled with the the high integrity threshold can
drive lobbyists to bid more conservatively.
Moving on to point 2: When (5/7)(w − t) < d < w − t, both lobbyists bid (p∗i , p∗−i)
where p∗i = (w + t − d)/2 and p∗−i = (3t − w + d)/2, for all i = {1, 2}, just enough
for the average bid to reach the legislator’s bias integrity threshold, (p∗1 + p∗2)/2 = t.
When the interval is moderately long ((5/7)(w − t) < d < w − t), lobbyists can always
bid aggressively to secure the win — however the increase in the winning probability
must be worth the increased cost. As the uncertainty on the legislator is still significant
when the bias interval is moderately long, bidding aggressively causes the lobbyist to pay
more than necessary to win the legislator’s support. The lobbyist is better off bidding
conservatively. The remaining lobbyist bids just enough to have him indifferent between
bidding conservatively and aggressively, keeping the average bid at the threshold.
Point 3 finds only two equilibria when d = (5/7)(w−t). Lobbyists can choose to either bid
similarly to when the bid is moderately long, (p∗i , p
∗
−i) = ((8t−w)/7, (6t+w)/7), or bid the
legislator threshold, (p∗i , p
∗
−i) = (t, t) , for all i = {1, 2}. When lobbyists bid the legislator’s
integrity threshold, the legislator always chooses his policy of preferrence. The integrity
threshold of the legislator covers not only the personal ideologies of the legislator but also
takes into account the preference of the constituency and the severity of the reputational
cost of being perceived dishonest. By bidding only the threshold, the winning lobbyist
obtains the legislator’s support in the policy making process, and the legislator does not
have to compromise his beliefs. Recall that in this paper, we look at lobbyist vying for
the support of a legislator. Although a legislator who already prefers a specific policy will
most likely vote for it when the issue is on the floor, winning the support of the legislator
would allow the lobbyist to access other legislators who may be critical to the policy and
increase informational transactions to ease the approval process. For the constituents,
the uncertainty on the legislator bias at d = 57(w − t) provides them with a clear view of
whether their interests are best represented by their elected legislators.
In point 4, a unique equilibrium is identified when (1/2)(w − t) < d < (5/7)(w − t).




i = (w − 2d + 2t)/3 and p∗−i = (4t − w + 2d)/3,
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for all i = {1, 2}, just enough for the average bid to reach the legislator’s bias integrity
threshold, (p∗1 + p∗2)/2 = t. With a bias interval that is moderately short ((1/2)(w − t) <
d < (5/7)(w − t)), bidding conservatively is risky as the interval is not long enough to
ensure that the opponent does the same. One lobbyist tries and bids aggressively to
increase the chance of securing the legislator’s support, while the other bids just enough
for the average bid to reach the threshold.
If the bias interval is neither sufficiently long nor short (i.e. w − t ≤ d ≤ (w − t)/2), we
find some interesting results. With the exception of d = (5/7)(w− t), the lobbyists do not
arrive at a symmetric equilibrium.
Lastly, for point 5: when d ≤ w−t2 , lobbyists bid (p∗i , p∗−i) = (w − 2d,w − 2d) to push the
average bid above the legislator’s bias integrity threshold, (p∗1 + p∗2)/2 ≥ t. Both lobbyist
tend towards bidding aggressively, pushing the average bid beyond the threshold, as the
information on the bias becomes more precise. A short bias interval implies that the benefit
of having the legislator preference is marginal. The winning bid needs to surpass both the
threshold and the opposing bid. As the difference between the legislator’s threshold and
bias adjused threshold is minimal under a short bias interval, the lobbyists both assume
that the opposing bid has already surpassed the threshold. As the bids are the same,
lobbyists are equally likely to win the legislator’s support. Notice that the equilibrium
bid is the just the difference between the wealth valuation and the full length of the bias
interval 2d.
Another way to view above is that if the uncertainty of the legislator bias is sufficiently
small relative to the difference between the lobbyist’s winning valuation and the legisla-
tor’s integrity threshold, the lobbyists bid aggressively. A higher winning valuation makes
the uncertainty of the legislator preference smaller in comparison. Similary, a lower legis-
lator integrity threshold decreases the condition (w − t)/2, making it more likely for the
uncertainty of the legislator to reach the condition. Center for Responsive Politics (2018)
reports that the top three sectors in terms of lobbying expenditure are Health, Finance,
Miscellaneous Business at over $500 million for each sector in 2018. All of these sectors
provide very high payoffs for the lobbyists. Alongside this, as the public is less likely to
have awareness on legislator positions on industry specific areas, the integrity threshold is
significantly lower than those in hot button issues. The reputation of legislators are less
likely to be questioned if lobbying requests are entertained for thesese issues. Although
the lobbyists may have less certainty in terms of the legislator preference, this is dwarfed
by the substantial winning valuation and the lower integrity threshold. This echoes results
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from existing literature that find business interests, trade associations, and professional
groups as groups with the highest level of lobbying expenditure (Baumgartner and Leech,
2001; de Figueiredo, 2004; McKay, 2012; de Figueiredo and Richter, 2013).
7 Conclusion
We approach the lobbying process as a cash-for-favour exchange. A simultaneous lobbying
structure is used to capture how lobbying proceeds behind closed doors. Under shadow
lobbying, where lobbyist- legislator interactions are kept private, lobbyists may not be
able to counter offer. The paper focuses on lobbyist interactions over one non-strategic
legislator and explores the impact of uncertainty on lobbyist behaviour in isolation.
The model explains how the relationship between the uncertainty on the bias of the legisla-
tor, the legislator’s integrity threshold, and the lobbyist’s winning valuation affect lobbyist
behaviour. When the uncertainty is sufficiently low with respect to the winning valuation,
lobbyists tend to bid aggressively to try and secure the support of the legislator. When
the uncertainty is sufficiently high, lobbyists bid conservatively in case the legislator has a
strong preference for their policy. Otherwise, the lobbyists bid just enough to ensure that
one lobbyist secures the legislator’s support. We also find that there exists an interval
length that allows us to observe the true preferences of the legislator despite choosing a
lobbyist to support at a bid equal to her integrity threshold.
The interactions above provide a snapshot on how lobbying may proceed behind closed
doors. The paper provides insights the public can use to assess legislator behaviour during
the lobbying process. Results above imply that issues with high monetary reward, lobbyists
bid more aggressively. These are also often issues where consituent ideologies are not as
clear cut. Political agents, however, may listen to constituent opinions and adjust their
preference intervals accordingly, which may ultimately affect which lobbyist she supports.
The model can be extended in future work to study outcomes for interactions under
asymmetric cases. Politicians often take advantage of uncertainty to gain excess rent.
Empirical studies on lobbying that include uncertainty of legislator positions may prove
valuable in the formulation of policy recommendations.
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A Computation of Nash Equilibria
The determination of nash equilibria starts with fixing one lobbyist’s bid to be either
below the lower bound, between the two bounds, or above the upper bound. We begin
with looking at the best responses of lobbyist 1 given p2. We then proceed to check if
lobbyist 2’s best response to lobbyist 1’s best response matches the initial p2 to determine
if a nash equilibrium exists.
Case 1: p2 ≤ 3t−w+d2
When lobbyist 2 bids below the lower bound, the best response of lobbyist 1 is
BR1(p2) =





2 . An equilibria exists if the best response of lobbyist 2 to p
∗
1 is below the
lower bound. We proceed to solve for equilibria depending on where p∗1 is with respect to
the lower bound and the upper bound below.
Case 1.1: p∗1 ≤ 3t−w+d2
We begin with checking the conditions where p∗1 is below the lower bound,
p∗1 ≤
3t− w + d
2
(14)
w + t− d
2
≤ 3t− w + d
2
w + t− d ≤ 3t− w + d
w − t ≤ d (15)










2 . If d ≥ w − t, p∗2 is also below the lower bound, making p∗1 a valid best
response. As p∗1 and p∗2 are mutual best response when d ≥ w − t, p∗1 = p∗2 = w+t−d2 are
equilibrium bids when d ≥ w − t.













(d− t + w)2
8d





From (14) and (15), we know that p∗1 >
3t−w+d
2 if d < w − t. To correctly identify the





4t + 2d− w
3
(16)
w + t− d
2
<





(w − t) (17)
Therefore, when 57(w − t) < d < w − t, p∗1 is between the lower and the upper bound. If
p∗1 is between the lower and the upper bound, the best response of lobbyist of the second
lobbyist is given as follows:
BR2(p
∗
1) = 2t− (




3t− w + d
2
Recall that the lower bound is always less than the upper bound for all permissible values
of w, d, and t. If p∗2 =
3t−w+d
2 , lobbyist 1 best responds with
w+t−d





mutual best responses when 57(w − t) < d < w − t, p∗1 = w+t−d2 and p∗2 = 3t−w+d2 are
equilibrium bids if 57(w − t) < d < w − t.
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When 57(w − t) < d < w − t, at p∗1 = w+t−d2 p∗2 = 3t−w+d2 the expected utilities of both













(3w − 3t− d)(3d + t− w)
8d
Case 1.3: p∗1 ≥ 4t+2d−w3
From (17), we know that when d ≥ 57(w−t), p∗1 from (13) is greater than the upper bound.
If p∗1 ≥ 4t+2d−w3 ,
BR2(p1) =





w − 2d + w+t−d2
2
=




4 . Obtaining the conditions where
3w−5d+t
4 is less than or equal to the
lower bound below,
3w − 5d + t
4
≤ 3t− w + d
2
3w − 5d + t ≤ 6t− 2w + 2d
d ≥ 5
7
(w − t) (18)
As p∗2 ≤ 3t−w+d2 only when d ≥ 57(w− t), and p∗1 ≥ 4t+2d−w3 only when d ≤ 57(w− t), both
p∗1 and p∗2 occur only when d =
5
7(w − t). An equilibrium p∗1 = w+t−d2 and p∗2 = 3w−5d+t4
exists if d = 57(w − t).
At d = 57(w − t), p∗1 = 6t+w7 and p2∗ = 8t−w7 . The bid of lobbyist 1 always exceeds that of
lobbyist 2 if the threshold is below the winning valuation. The expected utilities of each























When the bid of lobbyist 2 is between the lower and upper bounds:
BR1(p2) = 2t− p2 (19)
p∗1 = 2t− p2
Let p∗1 = 2t− p2. We proceed with checking for equilibria, determining the sets of values





Case 2.1: p∗1 ≤ 3t−w+d2
If p∗1 is below the lower bound, the best response of lobbyist 2 from (9) is BR2(p∗1) =
w+t−d
2 .
Let p∗2 = BR2(p∗1). Substituting p∗2 as lobbyist 2’s bid in p∗1, p∗1 =
3t−w+d
2 . From (15) and
(17), we know that p∗2 is between the lower and upper bounds if
5
7(w− t) < d < w− t. As







if 57(w − t) < d < w − t (See Case 1.2).














(d− t + w)2
8d
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If p∗1 is between the lower and upper bounds, lobbyist 2 best responds with BR2(p1) =
2t− p1.
Rearranging the inequality conditions for p∗1, we find the set of p2 conditions consistent
with p∗1.
3t− w + d
2
< p∗1 <
4t + 2d− w
3
3t− w + d
2
< BR1(p2) <
4t + 2d− w
3
2t− 4t + 2d− w
3
< 2t−BR1(p2) < 2t− 3t− w + d
2
w − 2d + 2t
3
< p2 <
w + t− d
2
(20)
Recall that p2 is between the lower and upper bounds. In order for p2 to also satisfy (20),
we check if the relevant end points of (20) is within the lower and upper bounds (i.e. lower
bound: 3t−w+d2 ≤ w−2d+2t3 and upper bound:4t+2d−w3 ≥ w+t−d2 )
w − 2d + 2t
3
≥ 3t− w + d
2
2w − 4d + 4t ≥ 9t− 3w + 3d
5
7
(w − t) ≥ d
w + t− d
2
≤ 4t + 2d− w
3
3w + 3t− 3d ≤ 8t + 4d− 2w
5
7
(w − t) ≤ d
However, we find that this is only true when the conditions intersect at d = 57(w − t),
where p∗1 = p∗2 = t. To determine if p∗1 = p∗2 = t are equilibrium be, we verify if p∗1 and p∗2
are in the interval (3t−w+d2 ,
4t+2d−w




Lower Bound at d = 57(w − t)




Upper Bound at d = 57(w − t)





As the winning valuation is always greater than or equal to the legislator’s integrity thresh-
old, t − w7 < t < 6t+w7 , p∗1 = p∗2 = t is an equilibrium at d = 57(w − t). and w 6= t. The
expected utilities in both cases of (5) provide the lobbyist with the same value.















Case 2.3: p∗1 ≥ 4t+2d−w3




w − d + p∗1
2
p2 =
w − 2d + 2t− p2
2
p2 =





3 , substituting this to (19),
p∗1 = 2t−
w − 2d + 2t
3
=
4t− w + 2d
3
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From below, we find that p∗2 is between the lower and upper bounds when
w−t
2 < d <
5
7(w − t):
w − 2d + 2t
3
<
3t− w + d
2
2w − 4d + 4t < 9t− 3w + 3d
5
7
(w − t) < d (22)
w − 2d + 2t
3
<
4t + 2d− w
3
3w + 6t− 6d < 12t + 6d− 3w
1
2
(w − t) ≤ d (23)
As p∗1 ≥ 4t+2d−w3 , we find that p∗1 = 4t−w+2d3 , p∗2 = w−2d+2t3 is an equilibrium when
w−t
2 < d <
5
7(w − t).
If w−t2 < d <
5














(d− t + w)2
9d
Lastly, we determine the best response of lobbyist 1 when p2 ≥ 4t+2d−w3 .
Case 3: p2 ≥ 4t+2d−w3
When p2 is above the upper bound, the best response of lobbyist 1 is given below:
BR1(p2) =










Case 3.1: p∗1 ≤ 3t−w+d2











1 is less than or equal to the
lower bound when d ≥ 57(w − t) (see Eq. 18). For p∗2 to be greater than or equal to the
upper bound, d ≤ 57(w − t) (16) and (17).







2 exists if d =
5
7(w − t).





















If p∗1 is between the lower and upper bounds, the best response of lobbyist 2 is given by
BR2(p1) = 2t− p1.




w − 2d + 2t− p1
2
3p1 = w − 2d + 2t
p1 =









w − 2d + 2t
3
=
4t + 2d− w
3




2 < d <
5
7(w− t). As






3 is an equilibrium
when w−t2 < d <
5
7(w − t).
As with Case 2.3, one lobbyist bids at the point where he is indifferent between bidding
conservatively and aggressively (see Eq. 11), while another bids just enough to keep the
average bid at the threshold when the bias interval is not short enough to bid aggressively.
If w−t2 < d <
5














(2w − 2t− d)(5d + t− w)
9d
Case 3.3: p∗1 ≥ 4t+2d−w3











w − 2d + w−2d+p12
2
4p1 = 2w − 4d + w − 2d + p1
3p1 = 3w − 6d
p1 = w − 2d
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Substituting p∗1 = w − 2d to p∗2,
p∗2 =
w − 2d + w − 2d
2
p∗2 = w − 2d
Note that w−2d ≥ 4t+2d−w3 when d ≤ w−t2 . Therefore, p∗1 = p∗2 = w−2d is an equilibrium
if d ≤ w−t2 .













7 Summary of Conclusions
Overall, the body of work provides insights on the policy-making process. The first two
papers discuss outcomes given competing incumbents aiming to maximize popularity, and
the third paper looks at how lobbyists behave given uncertain legislator preferences.
The results of the first paper showed how a politician’s private interests and the electorate
control, in the form of popularity payoffs, affect policy outcomes. As private benefits
increase, the propensity of politicians to be dishonest also increase. In terms of popularity
payoffs, the results indicate that positive public response on correct policy choices will
increase the incentive for politicians to be honest. However, one can only ensure the
unique implementation of the popular choice when the issue is salient. When issues are
non-salient and the payoffs from implementing a policy are sufficiently high, politicians
can pool on a decision to appear jointly as effective agents. Furthermore, an increased
requirement in decision-making of politicians will push towards the implementation of
popular policies. The impact of re-election and the introduction of a distinction between
socially optimal and popular choices will be interesting to explore as future extensions to
the model.
The second paper looked at policy outcomes when politicians have the opportunity to
pander. When the popular choice is unclear, pandering as a strategy disappears. How-
ever, when the popular choice is clear, both politicians pander in equilibrium. Without
private information, increased certainty on the socially optimal state does not influence
policy implementation. The outcomes depend largely on how salient the issues are and the
intensity of median voter preference. Uncertainty in public perception leads to strategic
divergence in positions by the politicians. Issue salience is an important factor in deter-
mining the type of policy outcome. Voters may be able to push politicians towards socially
optimal choices if key conditions are met. The introduction of information asymmetry,
and multiple issue platforms across one or two periods are interesting extensions of the
current model.
The third paper explored how lobbyists bid for a legislator’s support under uncertain
legislator preferences. Under low levels of uncertainty, lobbyists tend to bid aggressively
to try and secure the support of the legislator. However, when the uncertainty is sufficiently
high, lobbyists bid conservatively as the legislator may have a strong preference for their
policy. Otherwise, the lobbyists only bid enough to ensure one lobbyist wins the support
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of the legislator. The paper provides valuable insights that can be used to effectively
engage with legislators throughout the lobbying process. olitical agents, however, may
listen to constituent opinions and adjust their preference intervals accordingly, which may
ultimately affect which lobbyist wins her support. The model can be extended further in
future work to cover asymmetry in lobbying under uncertainty.
The work overall provides very useful insights on the policy making process. In analysing
the decision-making process, politician accountability can be exacted not only after deci-
sions are made. The effect of public opinion across different types of issues are explored
and the receptiveness of politicians to external avenues of profit are studied across dif-
ferent issues. The papers contribute to existing literatures of political agency, pandering,
public opinion, and lobbying. The results may aid in the development of avenues where
constituents can effectively influence policy during the policy making-process and curb
rent-seeking behaviour.
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